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# Latin America Report

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## LATIN AMERICA REPORT

No. 2672

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COUNTRY SECTION ARGENTINA

FORMER HEAD OF JUSTICIALISM DISCUSSES CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUE

Buenos Aires SIETE DIAS in Spanish 8-14 Mar 83

[Interview with Juan Manuel Abal Medina, former secretary general of National Justicialista Movement, by Mario Diament, special correspondent to Mexico, in Mexico; date not specified]

[Text] For 2,210 days, Juan Manuel Abal Medina's world was limited to the small space of the Mexican Embassy in Buenos Aires. He was 31 years old when he took asylum and 37 when the Argentine Government finally decided to grant him safe-conduct to leave the country. The former secretary general of the National Justicialista Movement has lived in Mexico City for 8 months and is employed by the Office of Federal Roads and Bridges. Abal Medina is probably one of the most controversial figures in the process that began with Peron's return and culminated with the military coup. Tied to the sectors of the socalled "revolutionary tendency" and perpetrator of one of the most upsetting episodes in the process to the military government -- the release of the political prisoners early on 26 May 1973--Abal Medina, along with former president Hector Campora, was one of the most disliked Peronists. Certainly one of the youngest Argentine political leaders, Abal Medina aspires to a long personal career. When we interviewed him in Mexico last weekend in the first interview granted to the Argentine press, he revealed that he was for the democratization of the Peronist movement, against the candidacy of Isabel Peron and against violence as a political instrument. The following is the result of 3 hours of conversation with the special correspondent for SIETE DIAS.

[Question] The 6 years of asylum in an embassy must have permitted you to reflect deeply on this period of Argentine history that began on 25 May 1973 and ended with the military coup. In your opinion, what big mistakes did Peronism commit?

[Answer] Peronism reached government with serious internal disorganization. Campora's government was the expression of some sectors of the movement, not all of it. This was not Campora's fault; he was part of the traditional sector of the Peronist movement. It was due to the burdensome presence of other leaders of the Revolutionary Tendency sectors who had undeniably led the process of Peron's return and the election campaign but had demonstrated poor management in relations with the union sector. This situation opened the way to people with personal ambitions like Lopez Rega and his group. Tied to a

far right policy, they managed to use unionism with these objective facts about their lack of participation in the government. In my opinion, they created a false opposition because unionism and the Revolutionary Tendency did not have such different lines as appeared later through the conflict instrumented by the Lopez Rega group. A gap appeared then that, I repeat, did not express real differences between those sectors. The best proof is that during the year we led the movement when I became an exponent of the Revolutionary Tendency, the persons closest to me were precisely union leaders Lorenzo Miguel and Jose Rucci. Rodolfo Galimberti was also very close to us although on a secondary plane. He was the most known public expression of the Revolutionary Tendency. Peron's return, the elaboration of the platform of the Justicialista Party following the programmatic guidelines of the Justicialista Front as well as the election campaign were all done in close collaboration with these union sectors. There was none of this drastic opposition that appeared immediately after 25 May. I always divide that process between the period up to 25 May when the movement really acted as a homogeneous whole and after 25 May when, through errors in the tactical leadership of the governmental sector -- not the movement -- these confrontations began to be generated. We were all involved in these errors. I did not hold any position nor have any governmental function but I could certainly have made errors in advice. I believe that the basic errors at that time could be placed in the orbit of the Ministry of the Interior where there was an excellent person, Dr Riggi, who did not have much political experience and was not close to Dr Campora. There were also errors around General Peron which made Campora's presidency less than serious. The power did not reside in the Government House nor did the president reside in the Government House: it went to Peron's house. In short, these were modalities of Peronism that were very surprising to us because we had not known about that palatial aspiration. I don't think the Argentina of 1973 was inclined toward that type of folklore.

[Question] In your own examination of conscience, what personal errors did you commit?

[Answer] It is difficult to pinpoint any error because my responsibility in the movement was short-lived. It was a decisive year but it was only a year.

[Question] That was a year when you had concrete responsibility. But there was all the prior activity within the Peronist movement that I would like you to add to this analysis.

[Answer] Before becoming secretary general of the movement, I had little involvement in Peronism. I met General Peron in 1971 and he gave me a number of tasks that I did personally, not connected to all the formal structures. Paladino was still in the delegation and was secretary general of the movement. These tasks basically concerned contacts with some nationalist military groups. Then with Campora as delegate and the possibilities of Operation Return visible, I received special responsibilities tied to that operation. After Operation Return was already advanced, I became secretary of the movement to direct Operation Return at the initiative of Rucci, Miguel and Campora, precisely to avoid the frictions that had begun to appear between the union sectors and the Revolutionary Tendency. I did not want to get into any other area that was

not specifically the return because I had not been a member in the movement for long and I did not want to intervene in the topic of candidacies. I did not feel qualified for that. However, the situation changed with the impossibility of Peron's candidacy which almost automatically meant Campora's candidacy. As a candidate, he could not continue directing the internal aspects of the movement. This responsibility fell to me without any preparation. It was, at that point, that I had my responsibilities. At that time, I did not have sufficient elements of judgment to suitably select candidates. I also did not agree with the way candidacies were distributed in the branches of the movement. I think that was absolutely anachronistic. For example, it was completely ridiculous that a person became a deputy or not simply because he belonged to such and such a branch of the movement. I think I should have opposed these things. However, I simply carried out Peron's orders. In 15 days we chose 3,600 candidates.

[Question] Was Peron the one who decided on that system?

[Answer] Of course. Basic decisions like how power was distributed were always made by Peron.

Exaltation of Violence

[Question] The Montoneros, as the armed branch of the Peronist Youth, not only chose a violent methodology in the earlier period and even during the Peronist government, but they exalted violence. It reached its maximum expression with the assassination of General Aramburu; your brother, Fernando Abal Medina, played a major role.

[Answer] Yes, my brother was the first chief of the Montoneros. However, I would like to explain: The Montoneros at one time were the armed branch of the Peronist movement rather than an armed branch of the Peronist Youth. The chain of command for the Montoneros was directly linked to General Peron. None of the local leaders of the movement were tied to them. I had met Mario Firmenich in secondary school. We were all students at the Nacional Buenos Aires although he was 2 or 3 years younger. I saw him again on 25 May when they were legalized. I don't believe Dr Campora ever met him. On the other hand, Peron knew him and talked to him frequently. Every once in a while, Peron mentioned this relationship to us.

[Question] Didn't you participate in the creation of the Montoneros?

[Answer] No, I was not even a member of Peronism at that time.

[Question] But you had some discussions with your brother about this subject?

[Answer] We talked a lot, yes.

[Question] It would interest me to know what scale of values was used to resort to violence, to propose the murder of political and military figures, to make a policy of robbing banks and kidnapping. What was the morality?

[Answer] I believe that, beginning in 1955, situations that were latent started to spread in Argentine society. Starting with the episode of 16 June, they acquired a level that was surprising to us and eventually terrified almost everyone, at least all sensible people. I mean the use of indiscriminate violence to settle political questions with questionable moral principles. Sectors of the church that came from a very interesting social background like all these youths who formed the Montoneros organization began to take more progressive positions. I believe some absolute values were transmitted to politics then that were not pertinent to politics. According to these, the physical elimination of an adversary can, at times, have the moral justification of the lesser evil. This spread throughout Argentina during those years. The effects of this situation led to the rise of all the guerrilla organizations. There was widespread violence throughout Argentine society during those years. This has been extensively analyzed and criticized even by many people who were involved in those episodes.

[Question] I insist on adding the word methodology, the word exaltation, because this is what happened. The terrorists presented Aramburu's assassination as a real feat.

[Answer] Aramburu's death is a topic that can be distinguished from the others although the general moral opinion is contained in what I just said. It can be distinguished due to its political circumstances. To Peronism then and now, Aramburu's death was not an assassination but an execution. Aramburu was more than the great enemy of Peronism; he was considered the murderer of the comrades. Perhaps unjustly, he personified the one responsible for all the violence committed against Peronism. Perhaps only Frondizi at one point dimmed this terrible image of Aramburu. I am referring to the time of the Conintes Plan. However, this stage passed eventually to oblivion and Aramburu returned as the focus of the hatred of the Peronist people. I didn't know about that operation to kidnap Aramburu. I was living in a working class area of Buenos Aires at the time it occurred. I didn't know who the Montoneros were or that my brother was involved in it. However, I saw public rejoicing.

[Question] Was that assassination also directly approved by Peron?

[Answer] There are some public facts about that. In a letter that was made public, General Peron approved the operation, calling it "an act of justice desired by all Peronist people."

[Question] What type of future did Peron expect for justice in Argentina if Aramburu's execution was decreed by an order of Peron or a group of Montoneros leaders? There was total disregard for the idea of justice. If he aspired to create a democratic future for Argentina, he began by trampling the meaning itself of justice.

[Answer] I believe it is necessary to distinguish two epochs here. In this entire stage of growth of Peronist activity—which was massive in some cases like the Cordobazo where there were marked situations of violence and the operation to kidnap and execute Aramburu—Peronism was not at all close to power. We had a government that continued to say that it was going to last

forever and based itself mainly on the repression of the working people to continue existing. A little before Aramburu's kidnapping—I believe it was one of the motives that must have led to that operation—many sectors in the army saw Aramburu as the key to continuity. I think that was the motive that led to Peron's decision to approve the operation. Later when we were approaching the election, we continually expressed the need to channel all the activities of the movement inside the law. We wanted those responsible for the events which had hurt the people for years to be punished but within the law.

[Question] Let us go into the origin of the Montoneros. I understand that they arose from sectors of Catholic nationalism.

[Answer] I don't know many details about that. Naturally, I know about the activity of my brother and some others. Here in Mexico I met some people who were involved with the organization. My impression is that they arose from progressive Catholic sectors rather than Catholic nationalism.

[Question] Some people suggested that its creation was the product of a pact with military sectors represented by General Imaz.

[Answer] I think that is a myth. The birth of the Montoneros was exclusively the initiative of this group of youths. I don't believe there were any other contacts than the formal ones with General Peron. I don't believe there were other ties, especially not with military groups. I was an expert on the military situation, I had many military friends and I never had one concrete fact about this.

[Question] With respect to your political origin, you arose from Catholic nationalism.

[Answer] Yes, certainly.

[Question] At the beginning, you were tied to Dr Sanchez Sorondo.

[Answer] At one time we collaborated on the magazine AZUL Y BLANCO.

[Question] How did your ideological movement toward the left take place?

[Answer] Well, I would say toward Peronism.

[Question] And toward the Revolutionary Tendency which had leftist members.

[Answer] I insist that my activities in Peronism were never under the auspices of any of those internal sectors. That way it was possible to achieve Peron's return and to reach 11 March with Peronism united. Because of my age, I had friends who were leaders of the Revolutionary Tendency but I also had unionist friends, some of whom were my closest friends within the movement. I joined the movement due to the contact with General Peron. Many of us who left Catholic nationalism had a certain evolution through reevaluation of democratic themes and, at the same time—here there is a leftist influence—the entire process of the Cuban revolution that was very attractive to us because of its

nationalism, its confrontation with imperialism. We took many elements from it.

[Question] This form of Catholic nationalism had some sympathy toward fascism. It was also responsible in the 1960's for acts of anti-Semitism.

[Answer] These were side groups which—as in the case of Tacuara and the Nationalist Restoration Guard—were generally tied to the intelligence services. They did not have much to do with the political nationalism in which we always participated.

Campora and Release of Prisoners

[Question] How was Campora named presidential candidate? What were the elements of judgment, to your knowledge, that led Peron to appoint a man who was not particularly representative of what Peronism was trying to express as a movement?

[Answer] I believe that there was a notable change in Campora during his work as Peron's delegate. There was especially a growing popularity for Campora caused basically by the return campaign we were touring the country with. Campora unquestionably demonstrated political conditions, especially the attraction he aroused at the popular level, that clearly made him different from almost all the other leaders.

[Question] I remember at that time that, viewed from outside the movement, Campora seemed to be almost a joke. I want us to discuss this.

[Answer] Probably he was not the best candidate if we had considered that process as a process of complete democratization. Peronism focused on this process with the idea that it was necessary to impose Peron's leadership on the country. The end of the Argentine revolution had to mean its defeat by Peron's arrival to government. Peron's ineligibility to be elected made us seek a candidate who was similar.

[Question] Who was the least risky, perhaps?

[Answer] Anyone who would have been the candidate and then president would have obeyed Peron's orders to the letter. The discipline in Peronism, the degree of attachment to Peron, is difficult to understand if you did not live it. I was surprised by the degree of attachment he had in the most diverse sectors of the movement, even those that tried little independent ploys.

[Question] How did the decision to release the political prisoners come about?

[Answer] The release of the political prisoners was a commitment assumed by the entire Peronist movement. The entire movement demanded the release of those comrades as the first act of government. The best evidence of this lies in those who directly participated in some of these acts: for example, the governors who received the released prisoners in the government houses. These governors were precisely from what was called "the Peronist right," people like Julio Romero, Bittel and Sapag himself.

[Question] The release of the prisoners took place in the midst of tremendous tension; no one knew exactly what was happening. I remember that Campora himself was almost taken by surprise and it seemed to be a decision imposed against his will.

[Answer] It was not like that. Some circumstances made it necessary to release the prisoners a few hours early, especially in the case of Villa Devoto where I was directly involved. Our idea was that the prisoners would be released on 26 May after quickly voting the Amnesty Law through both chambers. There was an agreement with the other political forces.

[Question] Was the agreement for indiscriminate release or were there sectors that demanded a case by case analysis?

[Answer] There were no other proposals for the Amnesty Law, as it was considered within Peronism, other than the executive bill, later approved by the chambers. There was not a single exception nor any observation by other sectors that led us to amend the bill. In the days before, there were many meetings with the other political and military sectors. There was absolute certainty that this was going to happen; there was no opposition.

[Question] You told me that unionism and the Revolutionary Tendency did not express basic differences before 25 May. I want to remind you that there were more than 600 killed in Ezeiza on the day of Peron's return.

[Answer] There was a confrontation in Ezeiza between the groups tied to the Tendency and another sector that, at that time, took a position within the movement. This was the sector led by Osinde with the collaboration of people from the intelligence services. Osinde talked with me a day before this episode and insisted on handling the security for the event with irregular groups. In my opinion, that was a very serious mistake by all the Peronist leaders-not letting that event be controlled by the security services. I stressed this at a meeting from which there are minutes. Also the event should not have been held at that place but within the jurisdiction of the federal capital where there were more possibilities of control by the Federal Police. I proposed the Autodromo as the rally place. However, the sectors tied to Osinde who was in close contact with Lopez Rega (some 10 Telex a day) systematically opposed this and mounted this gigantic provocation. This was the direct responsibility of these sectors tied to the intelligence services and to Lopez Rega and Osinde. There were no confrontations between unionism and youth here. There were minor episodes without arms and not in that precise area.

Lopez Rega and Peron's Decline

[Question] From descriptions I have received from people near Peron toward the end of his exile in Madrid--like Hector Villalon and Jorge Antonio--I have the image of Peron as almost senile with moments of great lucidity and other moments of depression and apathy in his daily life. These descriptions also show him virtually controlled by Isabel and Lopez Rega. Does this image coincide with the image you received in your meetings with Peron?

[Answer] I believe that this is absolutely incorrect and comes from a myth put together by the people you mentioned. Specifically, Villalon's case is almost pathological. Villalon did not have the slightest contact with General Peron. He has put together a history of belonging to an alleged superior command that did not exist. The only superior command was Peron. There were some credentials that we used to carry out concrete tasks. Around 1968 Peron assigned Villalon one of those tasks; that is the credential Villalon displays at every opportunity. Jorge Antonio had a very distant relationship with the general at that time. There had been some personal friction and he never liked Isabel. Antonio and Villalon began to circulate this story about the alleged senility of General Peron in 1972. I had all-day work sessions with Peron in 1971 and 1972 and later in Argentina in 1973. I did not observe the least sign of senility.

[Question] If that is true, what was Isabel's and Lopez Rega's source of power at that time and after Peron's return?

[Answer] Peron had several rather serious health problems that became worse in 1972. There was poor professional care in general that was covered up well by Dr Puigvert. The return of 17 November, the tension of that episode, the situation in Argentina definitely affected him. He left Argentina on 15 December. I saw him again at the beginning of January for the meeting with President Echeverria in Paris and I saw that his condition had deteriorated. I didn't see him again until 1 March 1973. He had seriously aged then. We had work sessions that only lasted 2 hours and still left him tired. During that period, because of his physical deterioration, there was a closeness to Lopez Rega and Isabel that had not existed in 1972. Specifically, neither of the two participated in any political meeting at the general's house. However, starting with this trip in March, Isabel and Lopez Rega remained at all the meetings which was very noticeable. Then came the first political talks I ever had with Isabel after 2 years of frequent contact with her. She began to have some influence on General Peron's decisions. However, I think this was very exaggerated. I think they had some influence on General Peron's decisions but not the influence some leftist sectors attributed to them to justify Peron's annoyance with positions they took under certain circumstances. Peron was very upset about the confrontations between the right and the left. These were Peron's annoyances and not a conspiracy as they tried to pretend. There were two clear episodes, both personal quarrels. There was his quarrel with Rodolfo Galimberti who had been in his confidence until the end of 1972 and then disappointed him. He considered him irresponsible. This culminated with the famous announcement of popular militias that deeply upset Peron who dismissed him from his position as youth delegate. The second was the attack by some leftist sectors against Rucci. In Peron's opinion, attacking Rucci was like attacking him. Peron reacted violently in these cases, especially when confrontations worsened and Rucci died. I think this made any unity within the movement impossible. Peron decided that he was going to put an end to those sectors.

[Question] This still does not answer my question about the source of the power of Isabel and Lopez Rega. We still have not talked about Isabel; we will later. Let's talk about Lopez Rega. What was Lopez Rega's source of power? What was his influence over Peron?

[Answer] I believe the main thing was the absolute proximity which made him more needed as Peron had more serious health problems. Lopez Rega was a really useful man for all those things. He even had some medical knowledge. Let's say he was a good nurse. He would go several nights without sleep, caring for the general when he had a crisis. He had absolute devotion to Peron. This made him take on more functions, especially when Peron returned to Argentina and found a movement that was turning into anarchy. There were very few people really in his confidence; he did not even have a minimal team. Peron's solitude during that stage was truly incredible. He could spend entire days without talking to anyone. Perhaps as a result of his aging, he began to show constant annoyance toward almost all the Peronist leaders. At that time, I was very disconcerted by the general's behavior and his judgments that practically destroyed everything. He did not act at that time consistent with his opinions. Confirmation of a cabinet that, at best, was useless was really a surprise.

#### Succession

[Question] Why did Peronism accept the appointment of Isabel as vice president? Obviously, the possibility that Peron would not complete his term was on everyone's mind.

[Answer] Peron's real objective at that time was to form a coalition with Balbin. Many people will try to deny this but it is absolutely true. Unfortunately, the witnesses are disappearing. General Carcagno was one of them. We talked about this subject extensively with Carcagno and Peron. I made the initial contact with Dr Balbin about this and was very well received. Then this initiative began to be bombarded from very diverse sectors of Peronism. It was bombarded partly because General Peron could not finish this term. Consequently, it was felt that we were handing the government over to radicalism.

[Question] Well, this had to be Peron's intention in planning this coalition.

[Answer] I think what happened was that Peron did not consider the possibility of his death. No one wanted to talk about this subject. There were several very obvious situations. There was a very long meeting in Gaspar Campos' house 3 days before the national party congress that appointed Isabel as a candidate. Peron was very annoyed with radicalism. Radicalism had not opposed the coalition but there had been interference by Peronism itself and intrigues with some radical sectors. He said that the congress could decide on the candidate for vice president because this was not very important. He returned to this subject on other occasions, taking all importance away from the topic of the vice presidency.

[Question] This was what you thought also or did you consider the possibility of Peron's death?

[Answer] I considered this possibility. Here I believe I can seriously criticize myself for not having expressed it more clearly. It was very difficult, especially since the Peronists did not speak in front of Peron. I was already

playing the role of the "enfant terrible." I thought about it on several  $\infty$ -casions but I didn't know how to say it. I didn't dare. I believe it was a grave responsibility.

[Question] Isn't it surprising that a movement that had so much time to prepare itself (the 18 years of Peron's exile), a massive movement filled, I presume, with intelligent people, let itself be dragged along mystically by a 78-year-old man to the point that no one questioned anything?

[Answer] It is surprising but that is exactly how it was. Peron's word was absolutely unquestionable. This reached the extreme in many sectors of the movement that a circumstantial comment on an author determined the literary tastes of entire sectors of the movement.

[Question] Don't you feel you were immature for power?

[Answer] I think so. I definitely think so.

[Question] How is it possible that this unquestioned leader could be surrounded by such questionable people as Lopez Rega, Villone and Lastiri? What psychological mechanism led Peron to relate to these people?

[Answer] Let us say that the only one of these close to Peron was Lopez Rega. The others fulfilled minor duties. Anyway, there is something of that in all great men. One assumes that all great men must have a circle of great men. However, if one looks at history, this is not generally true; instead, there are many people like Lopez Rega around the great men.

[Question] How was Peron's decision to name Balbin vice president received by Peronism? With a majority movement, Peron chose the leader of the opposition party. This shows that he did not have the necessary confidence in anyone in the movement to make him his successor. This must have been tremendously hostile.

[Answer] Two things were in play here. On one side, there was the general's decision not to leave a successor. He understood that the succession, the new head of the movement, had to come from internal political struggle. This was the basis of the coalition. Another feature of Peron's philosophy was to eliminate the quarrels with radicalism. He felt that the coalition between Peronism and radicalism was basic in order to be able to govern Argentina. With the Hour of the People—not in Paladino's time but in the preparatory stage for the return—I made soundings with radicalism to see about the possibility of a coalition. In this case, it failed because radicalism did not accept.

Morality and Assassination

[Question] Who is Mario Firmenich?

[Answer] I believe he is a youth involved in Argentine politics with perhaps very premature concerns, a little mixed up. It is difficult to go on with any

other description. I had serious problems with the Montoneros organization when I was leader of the movement. Now Mr Firmenich is in exile; he lives here in Mexico. The military considers the Montoneros organization a type of demon; to me, the demon is the military. I had confrontations with the Montoneros when they had enormous power in Argentina and many of the military did not. I do not want to have them now.

[Question] Don't you think Firmenich is an assassin?

[Answer] No, i don't think he is.

[Question] But...didn't Firmenich commit crimes?

[Answer] He probably has committed crimes. I believe at this time that the difference between the actions that were committed from revolutionary sectors and the actions that the armed forces have committed are in such a proportion that I do not call any enemy of the military bad.

[Question] Do you make a concrete distinction between the morality of one crime and the morality of another?

[Answer] Not at all. Crimes are condemnable and all crimes are deeply immoral. I reject them for every type of reason, religious and moral reasons in their broadest sense.

[Question] Then what makes Firmenich less of a criminal to you than others?

[Answer] Perhaps the situation we are all going through, the situation we all suffer. I have hundreds of missing friends who were not guerrillas. They were Peronist leaders and Peronist members and, in some cases, not even that. They were families of my friends. All that makes me qualify the adjectives.

[Question] There are many people who have relatives killed by Firmenich and the people who surrounded him.

[Answer] I think there has been a lot of exaggeration. I believe that, to justify the coup, all of this has been exaggerated. The coup was not carried out because there was terrorism or mismanagement in Argentina; those are all pretexts. These 7 years of the so-called process have demonstrated that there was another objective.

[Question] I am not talking about the causes of the coup. I am talking concretely about the action of Mario Firmenich and the Montoneros group and the crimes that have been admitted by the Montoneros themselves.

[Answer] I believe that crime as a political instrument is always condemnable and I condemn the crimes of the Montoneros organization.

[Question] Don't you think that Mario Firmenich answered at one time to interests other than those of the Montoneros group, that he was managed by forces outside Peronism?

[Answer] I couldn't say yes or no. Conspiracy stories are not generally true.

The Future

[Question] How did you live the 2,210 days isolated in an embassy?

[Answer] Well, it was like a luxury jail and was undeniably boring.

[Question] How did you live? What were the conditions?

[Answer] I had a room, the embassy library. I read and wrote; I didn't do anything else.

[Question] What were your chances for mobility?

[Answer] I could move throughout the house, being careful not to bother the ambassador or his family.

[Question] Were you in physical proximity with Dr Campora?

[Answer] We had rooms nearby and at times we ate together or talked.

[Question] What are the most important moments in your talks with Campora during those years of asylum?

[Answer] Campora was a man of, let us say, lineal Peronism. He had a fixation with 17 November, the most glorious day of his life. That is noteworthy because, although it is the day of Peron's return to Argentina, Campora had other dates that affected him more personally—the election of 11 March, for example, or 25 May. It was very unusual for him to talk about these subjects. He repeatedly returned to the subject of the return. For Campora, Peron's return was his political culmination.

[Question] Did he reproach himself for some things?

[Answer] He was content. He talked a lot about his career in Peron's service. He never had individual initiatives. In my opinion, he waited beyond all prudence for Peron's directives in even the most insignificant details.

[Question] Wasn't there a time when Campora thought of himself as president of the nation? I remember an episode in Madrid that probably marks the greatest crisis between Peron and Campora when Peron virtually forced him to go to his house to give him the command staff and the presidential sash.

[Answer] That episode happened but Peron did not force him. Both the sash and the staff had been prepared already to be given to Peron. There was a problem with Lopez Rega who delayed the entrance of the car in which Campora traveled. There are photographs that record that scene of the president stopped at the entrance of Puerta de Hierro. Peron said that it was "one of Lopecito's things." There could have been some envy by Peron at one time. There could have been something to this but Peron's affection for Campora remained unchanged.

[Question] Why do you think the military government so strongly opposed your departure from the country?

[Answer] I believe there is the memory of that process in 1972, 1973, when there were many events that upset the armed forces. Mainly what happened was that we-I am referring to Dr Campora and me-were responsible for a process in Argentina that completely defeated the armed forces. All the intermediate alternatives that the armed forces, already in a state of deterioration, wanted to achieve could perhaps have been managed with some other sector of the movement-for example, if Paladino had continued at the front. We obviously confronted the armed forces on every terrain. Although they do not say this for political reasons, Peron's return was a source of hatred toward Dr Campora and me in the minds of many of the military. The release of the political prisoners in which we were material actors is another subject that marked us. They have focused on us as their enemies in Peronism and I don't think they are wrong.

[Question] What is your political future?

[Answer] I continue to be a member of Peronism. I believe in Peronism as the expression of the majority—a relative majority but a majority—of the Argentine people, as the expression of the desires and interests of the Argentine working class. I hope to be in Argentina very soon acting within the Peronist movement. Obviously the movement will say the rest.

[Question] Acting in what way? Associated with what sectors?

[Answer] I will work in the same sector that I was in then. I believe that Peronism as a whole has concrete possibilities of modifying the Argentine society in the direction we want. Peronism as a whole is revolutionary. Consequently, the policy that we feel is most suitable is the policy of unity of the movement. Of course, we exclude from that policy all the sectors that have demonstrated that they never belonged to Peronism through their close tie with the military government.

[Question] I would like you to identify those sectors because, otherwise, this statement is very vague.

[Answer] I believe that the union sector that Triacca now leads, Robledo's sector and Matera's sector are not part of the Peronist movement.

[Question] Do you believe that the Montoneros are part of the Peronist movement?

[Answer] The Montoneros have formed a separate movement. They withdrew from the Peronist movement.

[Question] What do you think about Rodolfo Galimberti's statements in Sao Paulo supporting Isabel's candidacy?

[Answer] Galimberti is a boy with many political attributes. He is selftaught and original in his opinions. He attracts some sectors as he demonstrated in 1972, but he does not have a political line. It seems funny to me that he supports Isabel because he could have been for the Montoneros, then supporting Isabel and tomorrow he might be with Robledo. He is not serious politically. I have personal affection for him but I do not consider him serious politically.

[Question] Who is your candidate within Peronism to lead the movement?

[Answer] I believe it is very difficult to select a name at this time. Names arise from very specific occasions. Due to its structure, Peronism needs someone to take the lead a little ahead of the rest of the leaders. I see now that none of the current leaders knows how to have this vision of the whole movement which is necessary in order to lead.

[Question] At one point in this talk, you admitted that Peronism was not prepared to assume power in 1973. Do you think it is better prepared today? Has it overcome its vacillations, its infantile approach toward certain aspects of foreign policy?

[Answer] No. I think, on the contrary, that many of these aspects have unfortunately worsened. This is serious for the national future of Argentina because I believe Peronism is going to win the elections. Consequently, it is very important to propose a serious reorganization of the movement and a serious internal discussion of its program. We tried the same thing in 1972, 1973, and it was frustrated precisely because of haste in that political process.

[Question] If these vacillations have worsened, what chance does a Peronist government have?

[Answer] They have worsened compared to 1972 and 1973. I think that in the past year, after the jolt that the Malvinas War represented for the Peronist movement and the country, some concepts have been polished and points of agreement have been reached to permit many sectors of the movement to draw up a program. Perhaps, in the middle of this year, Peronism will surprise everyone by formulating a united program.

[Question] Do you favor democratization of Peronism or do you insist on the principle of verticality that has ruled the movement until now?

[Answer] Verticality is completely meaningless since Peron's death. Peron was irreplaceable and I believe Peronism must now become democratic.

[Question] What would happen with Peronism if Isabel Peron is again the candidate?

[Answer] I don't believe Isabel will be a candidate. I don't think she wants to nor do I think that the majority of the comrades want it. I am definitely opposed to that candidacy.

[Question] Do you think Argentina should approach countries like Cuba and Ni-caragua politically and ideologically?

[Answer] I believe that the policy we should follow is the same one we tried to follow in 1973. There is the clear precedent in Peronism of the Third Position and the policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Relations with it were resumed at that time. This was also revealed in recognition of Cuba and Vietnam. This does not imply alignment in any way with the Soviet bloc. I believe Argentina does not have any reason to align itself with that bloc. However, this does mean the development of independent foreign relations. Concerning the American situation, I believe that Peronism should have solidarity with the movements of liberation like the Sandinist government of Nicaragua.

#### Proposals

[Question] What chance does a government have that inherits this Argentina of 1983, this Argentina wounded by the missing, coming out of a military defeat, carrying a monumental foreign debt and the highest inflation in the world, with its productive apparatus half destroyed and with deep despair? What chance does a government, any government that comes out of the October elections, have?

[Answer] I believe that it has a chance because, in my opinion, it is all based on clearing up the three or four main topics you just cited. With respect to the military question, I believe that the political power of the armed forces must be eliminated. This is possible and I believe necessary, even for national defense. With respect to the foreign debt, we must seek formulas for renegotiation of this debt in union with other debtor countries. We advocate this policy and it is spreading. In fact, it is already beginning to be carried out by some of the governments. This was a proposal of a sector of Peronism in which I was involved approximately 1-1/2 years ago from my asylum in the embassy. Then it was taken up by COPAL [COPPPAL-Permanent Conference of Latin American Political Parties] and some other organizations. We have a serious disagreement with another sector of the movement that continues to uphold the advantage for Argentina to negotiate unilaterally. We believe that this debt makes individual renegotiation impossible unless based on economic prescriptions that are absolutely contradictory to what Peronism believes must be done in Argentina. These are the two main themes of democratic Argentina. Eliminating the political power of the armed forces also implies eliminating its economic power.

[Question] What is the future of violence in Argentina?

[Answer] It is very difficult to say today if we are going to be able to overcome that horrible stage of violence of every type that Argentina has suffered. From the distance, through comrades who travel and even from family letters, I perceive a weariness, a satiety, a very wholesome reaction of the Argentine society toward violence. I hope and I believe that now, perhaps, it is possible to achieve civilized forms of coexistence. I believe that is a main objective for the next government. It is necessary to demilitarize society and not just of military officers of the armed forces. It is necessary to demilitarize union life and political life. It is necessary to end their influence in Argentine society. I believe all Argentines in their same judgment, after the absolute insanity that all this reached with the incredible epitome of the Malvinas' problem, no sensible Argentine disagrees with these ideas. I believe that this will be possible this time.

7717 CSO: 8148/1102 COUNTRY SECTION BAHAMAS

FNM CHARGES GOVERNMENT FAVORITISM IN RADIO COVERAGE, OTHER AREAS

Blast at ZNS

Nassau THE TRIBUNE in English 8 Mar 83 p 1

[Excerpts]

FNM LEADER Kendal Isaacs today urged Government to save radio station ZNS and TV 13 from the "narrow-mindedness, pettiness and unfairness" that now "permeate them."

He also called on the public, "including fair-minded supporters of the PLP, to join us in protesting against the prostitution of these institutions so that they can come to reflect the Bahamian commitment to justice and fairplay."

Mr Isaacs was criticising the Bahamas Broad casting Corporation, a public facility, for not covering the special testimonial banquet given for Mrs Janet Bostwick, MP for Yamacraw, who made history as the first woman to be elected to the Bahamas

Parliament in its over 250-year history. The banquet was held to mark this historic event.

Mr Isaacs said he and his colleagues intended to "pursue this matter further."

Said Mr Isaacs:

"We remind the Government and the public that the Bahamas Radio and Television Corporation is a public facility, owned by the people of the Bahamas. It should not be the private propaganda tool of the PLP but should serve the public generally without bias and without prejudice.

"The Government should realize that a very large section of this community supports the FNM and that actions of this sort can contribute to the alienation of this group and deep disunity which will have serious and adverse effects on the nation.

Dupuch Comment

Nassau THE TRIBUNE in English 12 Mar 83 p 5

[Article by Etienne Dupuch]

[Excerpts]

THE TESTIMONIAL banquet given in honour of Mrs Janet G Bostwick, in the Crown Ballroom of the Paradise Island

Hotel last week Saturday was a brilliant success, not only because Mrs Bostwick is a splendid woman in herself but also because of its historical importance as she is the first woman to be elected to the House of Assembly in 250 years of parliamentary life in the Bahamas.

The occasion was an unqualified success. Both The Tribune and The Guardian gave the event front page coverage but, not surprisingly, ZNS radio and TV did not put in an appearance.

I say "not surprisingly" because, although ZNS is a public institution, financed and maintained with public money, it is operated exclusively as a propaganda medium for the government.

When they did not turn up for this historic event a friend of mine remarked to me that this is a measure of the government's arrogance and contempt for what is fair and decent in the Bahamas today.

This situation has existed for the 16 years the PLP has been in power in the Bahamas but Mr Kendal Isaacs, Leader of the Opposition FNM, very rightly feels that this was the "last straw" and that the public should rise in protest against this flagrant injustice in a supposedly democratic society.

He also called on the public, including "fair-minded supporters of the PLP, to join us in protesting against the prostitution of these institutions so that they can come to reflect the Bahamian commitment to justice and fairplay."

Unfortunately for the Bahamas and for themselves these men behave like ostriches that bury their heads in the sand when they feel threatened, forgetting that they expose their tail feathers to be plucked.

They display their blind arrogance in somany ways that the Bahamas has lost its place as perhaps the most attractive spot in the world for foreign investment and wealthy people to come and stay amongst us. And so the country continues on an alarming downward slide.

More and more the world press is becoming aware of the conditions that exist in the islands today.

A few days ago I received the following telegram from Ken Gordon, Editor of The Trinidad Express and Vice President of the IAPA Press Freedom Committee in the Caribbean: "Reference IAPA meeting in Mexico please advise status of press freedom in your country."

I have not answered his enquiry because I made a promise when I decided to live outside the Bahamas not to say or do anything that might further damage the image of my country in the foreign press. I have lived up to this promise. But the unfair pressures under which my daughter, Eileen Carron, Editor and publisher, is now obliged to carry on this newspaper have reached a point where I may feel we should just "shut up shop" and tell the world the painful truth about life in the Bahamas especially for anyone today, opposition to the government.

FNM Appeal to Pindling

Nassau THE TRIBUNE in English 21 Mar 83 p 1

[Excerpt] A LETTER was delivered to Prime Minister Pindling's office this morning asking him personally to find out why Radio Bahamas did not cover the historic

Janet Bostwick banquet. He was also asked to ensure that future discrimination against the Opposition would stop.

Opposition Leader Kendal Isaacs told the Prime Minister that on March 5 the Free National Movement gave a testimonial banquet to honour Mrs Bostwick, the first woman to be elected to the House of Assembly. ZNS, as well as the other news media, was invited to cover the event.

"My colleagues and I, believe a large section of the public," Mr Isaacs told Sir Lynden, "were quite surprised and disturbed when ZNS Radio and Television completely ignored the event and gave no coverage at all.

"I am writing to the Minister responsible for relations with the Broadcasting Corporation of the Bahamas and to the Chairman of the Corporation in connection with this matter," he told Sir Lynden. "However, my colleagues and I feel that it is of sufficient national import to bring this matter directly to your attention.

"This is not the first time that our party has been discriminated against by ZNS, but we have registered our protests in vain. We consider it a serious flaw in our democratic process that this practice has been allowed to continue, especially since ZNS enjoys a full monopoly on broadcasting and television within the Commonwealth.

"We, therefore, appeal to you to intervene directly in this matter to determine why ZNS did not cover the banquet and also to ensure that the practice of discriminating against the Opposition should cease."

Acklins Airstrip Opening

Nassau THE TRIBUNE in English 11 Mar 83 p 1

[Article by Anthony Forbes]

[Excerpts] PRIME MINISTER Sir Lynden Pindling Thursday officially declared open a multi-million dollar airstrip at Spring Point, Acklins urging residents to let it mean something for the "future growth and development" of the southeastern island.

Sir Lynden, leading a number of Government Ministers and other dignitaries to the opening ceremony, said that Acklins islanders must use the opportunity the new airstrip and terminal presents as a "symbol" and "starting point" to something new and big.

Sir Lynden said that word was out long ago that an airstrip would be built in Acklins, but circumstances did not allow it to be built in 1979, 1980 or 1981.

He said when it was announced in 1982 that the airstrip would be built, it was called an election trick. But he told the crowd of 200, who attended the ceremony, that he did not land on a "trick" yesterday, but on "something real."

Transport Minister Philip Bethel said the airstrip is to serve as the first in a series of events that should greatly improve the quality and standard of life for the people of Acklins.

Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Hanna, who is also Minister of Finance, said government is leading the way in doing something for Acklins, Crooked Island and Long Cay, all southeastern islands.

The recently-completed new airport has a runway length of 5,000 feet and provides both aircraft and car park facilities in addition to a new terminal building.

The airport will enable the people of Acklins to benefit from the scheduled Bahamasair HS-748 turbo-prop service and will provide much improved contact between Acklins and New Providence.

Roker Remarks

Nassau THE TRIBUNE in English 12 Mar 83 pp 1, 12

[Article by Anthony Forbes]

[Excerpts]

WORKS and Utilities Minister Loftus Roker, whose "navel string" is buried in Acklins, told residents of that southeastern island Thursday he was happy to build a \$2.2 million airport at Spring Point as a Government Minister, but not as "an Acklins Island man."

"I did not build an airstrip here because I love Acklins, I have done this because I ampart of a Government committed to the development of the Bahama Islands, and as Minister of Works the Government has decided that an airport should be built here," he said.

"And I was happy to do so as Minister of Works not as an Acklins Island man though," Mr Roker said before inviting Prime Minister Sir Lynden Pindling to officially declare the multi-million dollar airstrip and terminal open.

"And I want you to think about it and wonder if that is why it took so long for Acklins to get an airport," he said. "Acklins has produced famous sons and daughters, but when Acklins cry, the sons and daughters do not recognize that cry as the cry of their mother."

Mr Roker said that although his navel string is buried in Acklins. I was not nourished by Acklins. I was nourished by Acklins. I was nourished and brought where I am by the good people of North Andros," the constituency he represents in the House of Assembly.

in the House of Assembly.

"And I resent...and I resent the people of Acklins telling me when I come here about what a mistake they made and what a great man I am because they did nothing to bring that about and I know that everything that I have today as a politician, as a Minister, the people of Andros have took me and nourished me as a, son," he said.

#### Workers Party Objections

#### Nassau THE TRIBUNE in English 12 Mar 83 p 1

#### [Excerpt]

WORKERS PARTY
Chairman Rodney Moncur
Thursday criticized
Government for neglecting
Acklins and Crooked Island
and questioned the high cost of
the multi-million dollar
airstrip officially opened by
Prime Minister Sir Lynden
Pindling.

Mr Moncur said his party wants an investigation into the "very high cost" of the airport construction. He said the constituency is only receiving attention now because it is a proven PLP stronghold. (See Works Minister Loftus Roker's remarks on this page).

"The Acklins Trade and Development Association in 1975 asked for an airstrip to be established and had started to raise funds to build one, but was discouraged by the Pindling Government, despite the PLP's so-called self-help policy," Mr Moncur said.

"The Workers Party

"The Workers Party questions the cost of the airstrip, which was opened Thursday by Sir Lynden and we feel it is inconceivable that such a simple airstrip could cost \$2.2 million," he said.

He said the party maintains it is a "shame and disgrace" that Prime Minister Sir Lynden has not to their knowledge visited the home of his mother, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Works in 10 years.

Comment on PLP Policy

Nassau THE TRIBUNE in English 16 Mar 83 p 5

[Article by Etienne Dupuch]

[Excerpt]

YESTERDAY I wrote about the speech made by Works Minister Loftus Roker at the ceremony of opening a new airport at Acklins Island, the land of his birth. This should have been an occasion of joy and pride for the Minister. But his speech revealed an alarming feeling of bitterness against his own people because they had not joined the PLP fold from the beginning.

He made it clear that, if it had been left to him, he might have punished them further because they had exercised their right as free voters in a supposedly independent democracy, thereby emphasizing the fact that, while the Bahamas has become an independent nation, free of the British colonial yoke, Bahamians have lost the freedom they had enjoyed under that colonial "yoke."

Our people have been conscious of this unhealthy state of mind in the government, but this is the first time it has been so bluntly and cruelly revealed in a speech by one of its Ministers.

It might be said that this is the feeling of one man. Not so. This state of mind was implied by the fact that only a week earlier ZNS-TV felt it had the right to ignore an historic event when it failed to report a testimonial dinner given for Mrs Janet Bostwick, a member of the opposition, who is the first woman to win a seat in the House of Assembly in the over 250-year history of parliamentary life in the Bahamas. This should have been an occasion of pride for Bahamian womanhood, but this remarkable woman has been outlawed by a publicly-owned institution because she feels free to be allied with the Opposition.

CSO: 3298/488

COUNTRY SECTION BARBADOS

ST JOHN CALLS ON JAMAICA TO SCRAP DUAL EXCHANGE

FL240035 Bridgetown CANA in English 2331 GMT 23 Mar 83

[Text] Bridgetown, Barbados, March 23, CANA--Barbados today called on Jamaica to scrap its new dual exchange rate currency system, which has forced up the cost of regional imports there and triggered a virtual trade war in the 12-nation Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

Barbados' position on Jamaica's recently introduced arrangement where the U.S. dollar is traded at an official rate of 1.78 Jamaican dollars for "essential" imports and at a much more expensive rate for others, was outlined by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry, Bernard St John.

He told the annual general meeting of the state-run Barbados Export Promotion Corporation (EPC) that Barbados was against its CARICOM trading partners introducing devices which amount to a tax on the exports of their fellow members and to have a currency system where their manufacturers have a "decided advantage in their export opportunity."

"We have told the Jamaican Government this clearly and we have made suggestions, and we believe that the only way forward out of this impasse at the present time is for the Jamaican Government to recognise that CARICOM is of importance to them and the pre-existing rate should continue or there is a whole-scale (currency) devaluation in Jamaica," he told the meeting.

Jamaica on January 10 introduced the controversial system under which the cheaper official exchange rates applied only to "essential" imports, raw materials to be used in products to be sold abroad and for certain payments.

Other imports, including most of those from CARICOM are at the more expensive parallel market rate set by individual commercial banks.

The system has had the effect of raising the price of CARICOM imports in Jamaica by about 50 percent and making Jamaica's exports to its regional partners more competitive.

Barbados retaliated by floating its currency against Jamaica's in the hope of regaining some competitive edge and Trinidad and Tobago this week placed most CARICOM imports under license.

Mr St John told the exporters that while Barbados sympathised with the governments of Jamaica and Guyana in their balance of payments problems, "we believe that there is scope for considerable increase in trade between our countries."

The Barbados deputy prime minister also called for changes in the CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility (MCF), a mechanism operated by regional central banks to reduce the need for scarce foreign exchange to finance intra-regional trade.

Rather than continue to have the CMCF operated by CARICOM central banks, he said the facility should be made a full fledged institution of the Caribbean economic integration movement.

"We go on record as saying that we are perfectly prepared to pay our part in guaranteeing a loan to the CMCF for the purpose of financing the expansion on intra-regional trade," Mr St John declared.

Barbados he said had already shown its commitment to CARICOM by "permitting the credit in the multilateral trade to mount far beyond the capacity that Barbados could carry."

"Nevertheless, that is our commitment to CARICOM," Mr St John told the meeting.

cso: 3298/1237

COUNTRY SECTION BARBADOS

#### COUNTRY MEETS IMF CONDITIONS FOR STANDBY LOANS

FL112010 Bridgetown ADVOCATE-NEWS in English 6 Apr 83 p 1

[Text] Preliminary data for the end of March this year indicated that government had satisfied the performance conditions agreed to in its standby arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Prime Minister Tom Adams made the announcement in the House of Assembly yesterday on the second test period since the programme with the fund was started last October.

Under IMF standby-arrangement programmes recipient countries must meet certain economic criteria known as tests to be able to continue drawing from the fund.

Mr Adams said that at the first test in December, the government had satisfied the requirements of the programme and made a drawing from the fund of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 2.9 million, the equivalent of just over \$6 million, in January this year.

According to the prime minister: "The performance ceiling for March 31, 1983, were that the domestic assets of the monetary authority would not exceed \$97 million and the banking system lending to the public sector, including statutory corporations, would not exceed \$151.0 million."

Mr Adams said that at March 31, the net domestic asset, that is currency issued by the Central Bank minus the bank's net foreign assets, were only \$53.0 million, a little over half the upper limit agreed to with the IMF.

"By March 31 the bank had also repaid all its short-term borrowings on lines of credit with foreign commercial banks paying back \$20 million on March 30 alone," Mr Adams said.

He went on: "This has had the effect of reducing the gross foreign assets to \$209.4 million, some \$40 million less than at the end of December 1982 but an adequate sum representing more than two and a half months imports, imports."

He also stated that the net foreign assets of the bank, that is the gross assets less all the short and medium term foreign debt, were \$76.6 million, slightly higher than at the end of last December when the figure stood at \$75.8 million.

Credit from the banking system of the central government and statutory corporations is provisionally estimated at \$125.0 million, or according to Mr Adams, \$26.0 million below the IMF ceiling for March 1983.

He said that strong revenues during March and careful control of expenditures during the fiscal year helped government to keep its credit from the banking system within the limits agreed with the IMF.

The prime minister added that the level of credit outstanding at the end of March 1983 was \$32.0 million, less than at the end of March last year.

CSO: 3298/1237

COUNTRY SECTION BARBADOS

#### ADAMS DENIES IMF INVOLVEMENT IN DEVALUATION

FL112326 Bridgetown CANA in English 2312 GMT 11 Apr 83

[Text] Bridgetown, Barbados, April 11, CANA--Prime Minister Tom Adams tonight vehemently denied that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had asked his government to devalue the Barbados dollar.

The prime minister was reacting to charges by opposition parliamentarian, Dr Richie Haynes, who told a public meeting in Bridgetown last night that differences between Barbados and the IMF over an IMF-recommended devaluation was holding up presentation of the island's 1983 budget.

In a statement to CANA which reported on last night's meeting of the opposition Democratic Labour Party (DLP), the prime minister said presentation of the budget had been in fact delayed because of "mechanical reasons relating to the programme within the Ministry of Finance."

Mr Adams also stated that he had this afternoon been in touch with the IMF headquarters in Washington with a view to getting the matter clarified.

"I deny this (Haynes' statement) absolutely and categorically and I consider it unfortunate and mischievous...

"It is the most wicked and unparalled display of irresponsibility I have encountered in my 20 years in public life," Mr Adams said.

The prime minister stated: "The IMF has not requested Barbados to devalue and has not raised devaluation as a requirement for its programme with Barbados.

"It is not prescribing devaluation as a remedy for devaluation," stressed the prime minister, adding that Barbados gross foreign reserves could purchase imports for three months.

"There is no economic reasons why devaluation is necessary."

The prime minister said he felt compelled to make the statement because of the severe harm publication of Dr Haynes' statements could bring this country.

cso: 3298/1237

#### ENBRAER EXPECTS SALES TO TRIPLE IN 1983

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 31 Mar 83 p 26

[Text] Sao Jose dos Campos--Even though the first 3 months of this year have been much worse than the same period of 1982, the Brazilian Aeronautics Company (EMBRAER) estimates it should triple its sales in 1983, reaching about 118 billion cruzeiros. Of that total, exports will represent 45 percent, with the United States alone taking one-third. But this year there will be something new: for the first time in its history, the company announces that its greatest sales success--the Bandeirante --could be equalled or even surpassed, in number of units sold, by the new turbo-prop military trainer, the T-27, for which quantity production will begin next month.

"Although we cannot announce any firm sales, the prospect is that we will sell at least 40 of the T-27 units this year, which would represent billings of \$50 million," the company's sales manager, Ozilio Carlos da Silva, asserted yesterday in Sao Jose dos Campos. EMBRAER optimism regarding foreign sales of the T-27 is due, according to Ozilio, to the meetings that have been going on for several months with governments of several countries, especially in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. That is without counting Canada, he says, which recently sent a mission to visit the company's headquarters in Sao Jose dos Campos.

Ozilio revealed that conversations have begun with the governments of Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Tanzania and Honduras--most of them in an advanced stage. "But nothing is final yet." Preliminary talks have even been held with the British government. The engineer says, however, that negotiations at a government level are always lengthy, especially when dealing with the sale of military items. "EMBRAER is always hopeful that any government and its air force can anticipate its interest in renewing its fleet, which in commercial language means anticipating operational requirements," he asserts.

8834

CSO: 3342/92

STABILE PUTS 1983 GRAIN PRODUCTION AT 56 MILLION TONS

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 31 Mar 83 p 27

[Text] Agriculture Minister Amaury Stabile, after receiving a survey made by the Production Financing Company (CFP), said that in 1983 the country is likely to have a bigger harvest than last year, with 56 million tons of grain. With this, Brazil will have its fourth bumper crop since Figueiredo became president and announced priority for agriculture. There were 55.3 million tons of grain harvested in 1982, in spite of a drop of 2 million tons in soybeans as a result of bad weather.

This year authorities are predicting a soybean crop of more than 14.7 million tons, a 14 percent increase over the previous year. There is also a prospect of a \$300-million to \$500-million increase over last year's sales for the soybean complex (beans, meal and oil), due to greater export volume and recovery of commodity prices on the world market.

According to the agriculture minister, the corn crop will be 23.5 million tons, an increase of 1 million tons over the previous crop. In Stabile's opinion, this represents "sufficient supply," especially for sectors such as poultry and hog raising, which will make poultry exports more competitive due to stable prices for rations.

Two commodities--rice and beans--will have smaller crops than the year before, according to the agriculture minister's data. The rice crop will be about 8.8 million tons, a reduction of 300,000 tons from the 1982 crop. The drop occurred because of poor harvests in Maranhao and Goias, but will not endanger supply, according to Stabile, because the carryover from last year's crop is enough to prevent shortages.

The bean-crop forecast of 2.4 million tons represents a decline of 600,000 tons. But supply should be satisfactory, the agriculture minister emphasized, thanks to the 480,000-ton carryover held by the Production Financing Company.

8834

CSO: 3342/92

IMPENDING LAYOFFS OF 20,000 IN GOIAS CAUSE PANIC

Brasilia CORREIO BRAZILIENSE in Portuguese 20 Mar 83 p 10

[Text] Goiania--The mass layoff being threatened by the Goias government is likely to occur tomorrow, with the signing of a decree that will affect 20,000 state employees. Over 2,000 persons have been dismissed from the independent agencies and state enterprises, including the state legislative assembly. Dismissal of such a large number is creating a climate of tension and panic among government workers, because no one really knows who will be affected by Governor Iris Rezende Machado's measure.

The PDS [Social Democratic Party] representatives in the Goias Legislative Assembly, now in the minority, are protesting against the dismissals announced by the government because they will affect more than 20,000 persons directly and at least 60,000 indirectly, the latter being members of the dismissed workers' households. The PDS is also calling for the labor minister's intervention in the problem, "because the layoffs are unfair and purely political," according to Deputy Clarismar Fernandes, leader of the PDS in the assembly.

The reduction in force of state employees is justified by Governor Iris Rezende on the grounds of reducing expenditures. The state's budget for each month is 30 billion cruzeiros, nearly all of it going to salaries. The Education Secretariat, for example, has monthly income of 6 billion cruzeiros and Secretary Adhemar Santillo asserts that he took office with the secretariat 30 billion cruzeiros in debt. Teachers' salaries, not paid since December, are 2.8 billion cruzeiros in arrears. As a result, he will either have to request additional funding or resort to a mass layoff, a measure already being put into practice.

#### Panic

Some agencies have already begun layoffs: CELG (Goias Electric Power Plants) dispensed with the services of 1,200 workers considered "surplus"; FEBEM (Child Welfare Foundation), 250 others; CERNE (a consortium of radio broadcasting and news agencies) and the Education Secretariat are making their lists.

An already consummated fact, and one which generates a climate of ill will, is the case of the Legislative Assembly. With the "jumbo package" of administrative measures announced by its president, Deputy Juarez Magalhaes, about 200 were put out on the street, from a staff of just over 800 employees. Moveover, 136 others,

pertaining to other agencies and city governments, have been sent back home. During the Friday plenary session, the dismissed employees sat in the galleries in protest. Whenever PDS legislators criticized the measure, considered "vengeful" by them, the dismissed workers applauded. When Juarez asked the gallery for silence, he was promptly booed. The assembly president called the police, asking that the gallery be cleared, and requested police protection in the halls of the legislature. Since the beginning of last week he has been receiving death threats from anonymous telephone callers, because of the "jumbo package."

Saying they were revolted by the situation, the PDS deputies met after the session to take steps. The first of these was to try, as early as next Wednesday, to have an appointment with Labor Minister Murilo Macedo, when they will request ministerial intervention. They will ask for Murilo Macedo to act not only in regard to the legislative assembly, but in regard to the entire state of Goias.

According to the "jumbo decree" that will come out tomorrow, all those hired in public agencies or state enterprises since April of last year--"PDS election-related hirings"--will be dismissed; however, it is also known that persons who had worked in the legislative assembly for over 6 years were dismissed. Public servants are afraid that the government will follow the idea of Juarez Magalhaes, who confessed he had also adopted "political criteria" for the layoffs.

The day before yesterday, Iris Rezende revoked the decree signed by Ary Valadao last year granting permanent status to all civil servants hired by the state. The argument was the same as used for the layoffs: "an election-related political measure which is contrary to labor legislation."

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CSO: 3342/92

CACEX HEAD ASSURES \$6 BILLION TRADE SURPLUS

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 27 Mar 83 p 47

[Text] It will be hard to restrict Brazil's imports this year to the established ceiling of \$17 billion, but nevertheless the goal will be met and the trade surplus will be \$6 billion. This is the assurance of CACEX [Foreign Trade Department] Director Carlos Viacava in an interview granted INDUSTRIA E DESENVOLVIMENTO magazine—which goes on sale tomorrow—in which he asserts it is easier to export \$23 billion than to restrict imports to their established limit.

In the interview, Viacava acknowledges that at first the \$17 billion import ceiling "was a big handicap for the private sector, for business, because this total has to be reduced by \$9 billion for petroleum, \$2 billion for state enterprises and \$500 million for wheat. So that leaves only \$5.5 billion for the private sector."

According to the CACEX director, the great pressure that this cut provokes "falls on most business firms, which have to formulate import and export programs listing essential raw materials, parts and components. Industry needs these raw materials; they are indispensable. This is what was threatened by the \$17 billion ceiling."

He recalled, however, that there are factors favorable to meeting the goal: "It was projected that Brazil would import \$9 billion of petroleum, with a barrel costing \$34. As the price has fallen to an average of \$27, we are estimating an improvement of \$1 billion."

#### Postponement

Carlos Viacava acknowledges that, to avoid exceeding the limit, the government will have to restrict some imports: "We must postpone what is postponable: new investment, importation of a machine, importation of nonessentials. Not that a machine is nonessential, but the investment can be made next year. We have hardly any foreign exchange and what little we have we must use for what is absolutely essential to maintain the productive process."

CACEX intends to reach its goal, according to its director, by making selective cuts: "It is much more convenient for the bureaucrat to make an across-the-board cut, where he doesn't run any risk, but that would be, let us say, less intelligent management. It is necessary to identify, among what is being imported, those things that are really essential, without which a factory could even be shut down."

Asserting that it is necessary to study the market thoroughly, Viacava explained in the interview that the world should be divided into oil-producing countries and all other countries: "We have a \$6 billion deficit with petroleum producers and a \$7 billion surplus with the rest of the world. So it is clear that if we quit buying apples we are going to lose something, but we are going to seek improvements from where we must buy petroleum, where the trade level is much higher. This is being done."

### Aggressiveness

One of the government's concerns, explained Viacava, is to increase the nation's aggressiveness in trade with petroleum producers: "This is a lengthy process, which we are not just beginning now, but began some time ago. The work is being done by Petrobras, the Finance Ministry, Itamaraty [Foreign Affairs Office] because it is logical: to the degree that the petroleum market shifts in our favor, we must try to benefit from it."

The optimistic CACEX director believes that "it is with the petroleum-producing countries that Brazil can increase its international trade, because we can sell them everything. They are now selling petroleum and buying in Europe, where they don't get as much for their money as they would from us."

He does not consider the forecast of exporting \$23 billion excessively optimistic, recalling that there are signs of recovery, especially in the United States: "January and February were not brilliant months; they were so far from being brilliant that the maxidevaluation was adopted, the effects of which will begin to be felt from April on. Last year it was the same thing: the surplus was accomplished in the last 3 months, which also happened in 1981."

In regard to financing, Carlos Viacava asserted there is no problem: "We have FINEX [Financing and Export Fund], one of the most aggressive financing mechanisms. We are not going to win every competition, but Brazil's exporter is on an even footing with any Eximbank."

#### Paperwork

Simplifying paperwork for exporting is a good idea, Viacava told INDUSTRIA E DESENVOLVIMENTO, but this process must be handled carefully: "All of the efforts I have seen to simplify the bureaucratic process ended up complicating it. I don't think this much-discussed paperwork for exporting really amounts to all that big a thing. All exporters know they have to get a license, and as they get it, this has been functioning. It's not a big problem; it would be nice to simplify it, but we must be careful not to end up complicating the process."

The idea of establishing a Foreign Trade Ministry, advocated by several exporters, does not have the CACEX director's approval: "Foreign-trade policy is now a function of the finance minister; it is under his responsibility and all the mechanisms --CACEX, CPA [expansion unknown], Federal Revenue Service--are concentrated in his hands. What is necessary--and what we have--is coordination among the Finance Ministry, Itamaraty and Petrobras. A Foreign Trade Ministry would be unable to do anything if not coordinated with the Finance Ministry."

According to Viacava, to improve foreign trade, "there must be an exchange policy, a monetary policy and a fiscal policy. In my opinion, one more ministry would simply be one more problem."

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COUNTRY SECTION BRAZIL

CDI OFFICIAL PROJECTS NO INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN 1983

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 27 Mar 83 p 42

[Article by Cesar Fonseca: "CDI Says Industry Will Not Grow in 1983"]

[Text] Brasilia--Everything indicates that the industrial sector will have the same performance in 1983 that it had in 1982. In other words, there will be no growth because, according to the executive secretary of the Industrial Development Council (CDI), Getulio Lamartine, the principal cause of the industrial setback in the last 2 years--lack of liquidity--will persist throughout the year.

Ever since the beginning of 1981, when the government chose, because of current domestic and foreign conditions, to concentrate on lowering the balance-of-payments deficit, it cannot be denied, Getulio said, that the industrial sector has been the hardest hit. An austere monetary policy has left less and less funds for industry and, as a result, slowed down the pace of sales, as lack of working capital led to inventory depletion.

There is, moreover, only a remote possibility that the struggle against the foreign deficit will be any less intense during the next 2 years, as lack of liquidity will likewise persist in the international financial market, with domestic repercussions to the same effect. Getulio Lamartine thus sees no solution but to somehow make the best of things as they are, since it is practically impossible to make any prediction for the short, medium or long term.

The CDI executive secretary said he has no doubt that this adjustment is already taking place. The days of anxiety, of uncertainty, of crisis, during which the government lived in a constant state of suspense-beginning with the closing of the financial market in September, the negotiations with the IMF and then the tedius negotiations with the creditor banks-have passed. Once the prolonged tension was reduced, rationality returned and it is now possible to see some light at the end of the tunnel.

This adjustment, however, was not sufficient for Getulio Lamartine to make a prediction about the industrial sector's chances in 1983. He said he did not want to repeat the error of last year, when he made three predictions, of 3 percent, 2 percent and 1 percent for the year and ended up with 0.12 percent [growth], but he remarked that the data for the sector's performance in the first 2 months of this year are not good. The capital-goods sector may decline more than in January and

February of last year, 29.4 percent and 21.7 percent, respectively. The same thing could occur with intermediate and consumer goods in comparison with the declines of the first 2 months last year. Intermediate goods declined 13.6 percent and 15.4 percent and consumer goods fell 8.6 percent and 10.2 percent.

Certainly, Lamartine said, the first 6 months will not be good for industry, just as they were not good in the same period of 1982. He recalled, however, that, although on the one hand the liquidity crisis has worsened and will be more severe than in the first 6 months of last year, on the other hand an event just as serious caused similar consequences during that period--the Malvinas war. After a little more than 1 week of the Anglo-Argentine conflict, trade between Brazil and other Latin American countries was abruptly interrupted and the toll on the year's trade balance was inevitable.

## Recovery in Second Half

But in the second half of this year, Lamartine predicts a recovery in industrial activity. His hope is that recovery of the U.S. economy is beginning to produce positive effects for Brazil, increasing exports to the United States. Rebuilding of inventories, for manufactured goods as well as raw materials, said Lamartine, will be inevitable on the part of U.S. industry and trade, and will improve the outlook for Brazilian industry.

Recovery of the domestic market from the crisis should also occur, in Lamartine's opinion. At least, he pointed out, the situation will not get worse than it is now. He doesn't expect government economic policy to get more austere, deepening the recession. Even if it is not possible to meet the commitment of achieving a trade surplus of \$6 billion this year and reducing inflation below 100 percent--commitments made to the IMF--the government is not likely to make economic policy more rigid if the nation's social stability seems to be at stake--"I don't believe the situation of the domestic market will get worse," Lamartine asserted.

In his opinion, Brazil's industrial infrastructure is capable of responding to the crisis. In fact, he says, it has been responding since 1975. In that year the share of Brazilian exports in the world market was 2.7 percent. In 1980 it rose to 3.2 percent, when "no country was showing an increase." Even in 1981, he added, when exports of all countries fell indiscriminately, the decline in the Brazilian industrial sector (6 percent), the largest in the nation's history, was less than the overall average shown in world trade. Despite the 1981 recession, this was repeated in 1982, in which year the performance of Brazilian industry was the best among all Latin American countries, he said.

The vitality of Brazilian industry results, according to Lamartine, from its youth. He explained that 60 percent of its industrial capacity is less than 10 years old; it has been installed since 1970. It is quite competitive and its reaction to challenges presented by the crisis has been positive. It is enough to note, he stressed, that despite the decline of 6 percent shown by the sector between 1981 and 1982, consumption of fuel oil in industry declined 30 percent. Some of this, he explained, results from administrative decisions, but most of the change is due to greater efficiency.

Lamartine made special mention of the BEFIEX [Commission for Concession of Fiscal Benefits to Special Export Programs] program of export incentives, which has made export commitments of \$70 billion to be carried out over a 10-year period. Last week, for example, the Sao Paulo firms Alpargatas and Samaritano signed contracts with BEFIEX amounting to \$1.3 billion.

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COUNTRY SECTION BRAZIL

#### BRIEFS

RUSSIAN MISSION IN MANAUS--Manaus--The Soviet Union scientific mission arrived in Manaus yesterday aboard the oceanographic ship "Professor Shtokamn" to study the Amazon River's influence on the Atlantic Ocean. According to the Russian scientists, who regard the Amazon region as "a wonderland," all of Russia's rivers together represent only 8 percent of the waters emptying into the Atlantic, whereas the Amazon is responsible for 18 percent. The Russian scientists want to learn how the waters of the Amazon act -- to identify the quality of the carbon -- and to check out the exact dimensions of the sediments and optical properties, to make a thorough study of the Amazon region's flora and fauna. The research will be the same as that conducted by the Cousteau expedition last year along the river's channel, with one small difference: "The Russian expedition is more scientific; it is doing pure research, whereas Cousteau's was more interested in publicizing its studies," the chief of the Soviet expedition, Viatcheslav Gozdeev, remarked. He said there is a great difference between his country's rivers and the tropical ones of the Amazon region. "As soon as we entered the Amazon region, we felt as though we were in a 'wonderland.' Everything here is beautiful, natural, exotic, inspiring," said Viatcheslav Gozdeev, who explained it was still too early for the expedition to offer any conclusion about the first 10 days of research conducted since leaving Belem and arriving in Manaus. The Soviet expedition is composed of 22 scientists, 3 of whom are Brazilian. [Text] [Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 30 Mar 83 p 10] 8834

CSO: 3342/92

COUNTRY SECTION CUBA

#### FIRST OCEANOGRAPHIC SHIP BUILT IN COUNTRY

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 26 Feb 83 p 5

[Article by Fernando Davalos]

[Text] The first Cuban oceanographic ship, the "Triton," 24 meters in length, will be delivered to the Academy of Sciences today, Saturday, in a ceremony in Chullima, near the Almendares River, where it was built.

The modern ship, with a displacement of 190 tons and a range of 3,240 nautical miles, constitutes a specialty item in terms of shipbuilding in view of the fact that, due to its specifications, it may be worth a million pesos in hard currency outside the country.

The "Triton" recently completed its trial run at sea and has already on three occasions carried out day's runs with its complement of oceanographers and crew. It can accommodate 14 persons.

It has a 340-HP engine with which it is capable of making 9 knots (1 knot = 1 nautical mile per hour); it has a beam of 6.4 meters and a depth of 3.45 meters. It is equipped with a radar with a range of 64 miles, sonar, an automatic pilot, direction finding equipment and radiotelephony.

As far as the hull and part of the superstructure are concerned, its design is similar to that of a shrimper of the same length of the "Caribe" class. Specialist from the Chullima Shipyards Technical Department were responsible for designing it as a ship to be used for oceanographic research.

The "Triton" has two laboratories for its scientific operations, one of them air-conditioned below deck and the other in the superstructure, in which any samples of water, marine species of fauna and flora and items from the depths that are obtained may be analyzed.

For this purpose a winch (manufactured in Cuba at Galainena Shipyards in Casablanca) that will use Nansen bottles to take samples from different depths has been installed. Furthermore, it has two outriggers (arms) to drag nets and the equipment needed in those places where they may perform specific functions.

Aside from their equipment, the laboratories have a storeroom (freezer) to preserve samples, in addition to the marine and food refrigerators.

The new "Triton" — the name of an ancient mythological sea god — has cabins for the men and women who make up its crew of seamen, biologists, chemists and oceanographers. It has a kitchen and a mess, a wardroom, baths and other facilities.

11,466 CSO: 3248/629 COUNTRY SECTION CUBA

## RODRIGUEZ ON NONALIGNED SUMMIT RESULTS

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 14 Mar 83 p 5

[Interview with Politburo member and Vice President of the Councils of State and Ministers Carlos Rafael Rodriguez by Julio Garcia: "We May Consider the Outcome of the Seventh Summit Conference to Be Extraordinary's; date and place not given]

[Text] On our return trip to Cuba in flight over the North Atlantic, we asked Dr Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a member of the Politburo and vice president of the Councils of State and Ministers to give us his opinions on the final outcome of the Seventh Conference of Nonaligned Countries recently concluded in New Delhi.

After several days and nights of exhausting work, the short visit in Berlin, the capital of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) served to repair our energies and engage in a profitable and fraternal dialogue with the leaders of the GDR, headed by the secretary general of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and president of the GDR Council of State, Erich Honecker. Then, after resting for a few hours, our plane resumed its long voyage from Delhi. to Havana.

In the cabin he occupied with the commander in chief and other members of our delegation, Carlos Rafael graciously consented to answer the questions we had prepared.

His testimony is of exceptional value in obtaining a final balance sheet on the Conference of Chiefs of State or Ministers held in the Indian capital. Carlos Rafael was almost constantly at Fidel's side during those few days, just as were Almeida, Risquet, Montane and Malmierca, and occupied a central position in the direction of the Cuban delegation's activities, as befits his responsibility for our nation's foreign relations.

[Question] How would you sum up the outcome of this Seventh Conference?

[Answer] I feel that we may consider the results obtained at the Seventh Conference to be extraordinary, especially when we take into account the circumstances under which it was held, the little time India had to organize it and the confused and contradictory international situation. The documents

that were approved are excellent, accurately point out the causes of the present international crisis and in a courteous but clear fashion are a condemnation of the harmful role which the American administration, headed by Reagan, is today playing in international politics and also in the worsening of the economic crisis the capitalist system is undergoing but whose effects are extending more and more and with greater danger toward the developing countries springs from their pages. "The New Delhi Appeal" is a document that may in its turn mobilize not only the thousands of millions of people of the so-called Third World, but also the hundreds of millions of men and women of the industrial nations, naturally those of the socialist countries, but also the workers and public opinion of the capitalist countries and many enlightened leaders of those self-same industrial nations who can find a path to peace, disarmament and development in its pages.

[Question] Would you in particular comment on the conference's declarations with regard to Latin America and the Caribbean?

[Answer] Of course. Latin America and the Caribbean's role appropriately reflects the situation in the area and the solutions required by it. We Latin American countries were not completely satisfied with the first drafts and presented the point of view - which was accepted - that the conference ought to reflect the results of the Ministerial Conference of the Bureau of Coordination held in Managua in January of this year, which took place after the composition of the document that had been presented to us. In the new version note is taken of the dramatic situation in El Salvador and the dangers of aggression against and intervention in Nicaragua, the brutal repression of Guatemala and also of the need for political solutions negotiated with the participation of all elements which may lead to peace in the region and a democratic solution of the Salvadoran problem. It is very important to stress the fact that this version was agreed on by a broad consensus within the Latin American and Caribbean Group and jointly defended by those countries on the Political Committee, which is an indication of the growing degree of unity of the countries of our region on these problems and the fight for the decolonization of the Falklands, a question that also constituted one of the essential elements introduced into the declaration.

[Question] Another question: In your opinion, how was the Cuban chairmanship and Fidel's role at the head of the movement these past 3 and a half years evaluated by the chiefs of state or ministers?

[Answer] We would not want to appear to be boastful in emphasizing the extraordinary role Comrade Fidel has played at this conference, which in my opinion was no less important and even more decisive than the one he played at the Sixth Conference.

On taking leave of Fidel, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Indian officials emphasized the invaluable aid the commander in chief and the Cuban delegation as a whole had provided India in the successful conduct of the conference.

The high esteem in which the international community today holds the person of Fidel Castro is reflected in the information arising from the very conduct

of the conference. On the one hand, not one of the five chiefs of state or ministers who at one time or another spoke at the summit conference failed to praise Fidel's performance during this period of 3 and a half years during which he has led the movement and his exceptional wisdom in managing the transfer of the movement's headquarters from Baghdad to New Delhi, thus keeping movement unity intact. On the other hand, Fidel's importance was underlined by the fact that, during the few days we were in Delhi, over 40 chiefs of state or ministers and a large group of heads of delegations not represented at that level wanted to talk with Fidel and had excellent conversations with him. I had the privilege of being present at most of these and of seeing for myself that chiefs of state quite distant in terms of ideology and attitudes from our first secretary respect him as a dear and close person and familiarly discuss with thim the common problems that afflict our peoples.

And lastly, the speech our president gave had an extraordinary impact on the conference and had a powerful effect on the results achieved at it. Also the distribution of Comrade Fidel's book on the economic and social crisis the world is going through was avidly awaited and there was an enormous rush to obtain copies of that valuable work. I understand that almost 5,000 copies of it in Spanish, English and French were distributed during the term of the conference. The document was influential from the moment people knew about it and more than one chief of state or minister referred to it in his talks.

[Question] To what extent do you believe the chairmanship of India may have contributed to the outcome of the conference?

[Answer] India naturally played a decisive role at the Seventh Summit Conference. The captiavating personality of Indira Gandhi, who is capable of governing with a timid feminine smile but with constant energy, was present during all the difficult moments that confronted the conference — and there were many — and which it overcame.

India's deliberate policy, its acknowledged independence, its adherence to the principles of the movement, which Pandit Nehru contributed so much to, make India's role one of supreme importance for the balanced direction of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries.

[Question] And finally, Comrade Carlos Rafael, what can you tell us about the work of the delegation and our other Cuban comrades at this conference?

[Answer] The delegation was a new model of political and ideological cohesion, which is typical of our country, our government and our state. Each of us, from those of us who accompanied the commander in chief in the administration (Almeida, Montane, Malmierca and I) to the most unassuming of our comrades, worked at an exhausting pace. There were stenographers, typists and interpreters who went for almost 48 hours without sleep, reworking our proposals, preparing documents and assisting Comrade Fidel in his tireless effort. Our comrades of the state agencies which are responsible for the security of our leaders once again demonstrated their great efficiency. On the conference political and economic committees the role of our comrades in performing tasks that require technical skills and diplomatic ability again permitted us to confirm the level

of expertise our staff personnel have achieved. As for the journalists, the people of Cuba were able to judge for themselves how they dedicated themselves to the job of keeping our country informed on everything that happened at this conference. In conclusion, I believe that we may all be satisfied with this multipurpose, homogeneous and efficient team.

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CSO: 3248/629

COUNTRY SECTION CUBA

### LLOMPART DISCUSSES ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Havana CUBA INTERNACIONAL in Spanish Feb 83 pp 18-21

[Article by Javier Rodriguez: "Cuban Cooperation: Under the Sign of Internationalism"]

[Text] Economic cooperation has played an important role in dealing with the merciless economic attacks of the United States and its futile effort to strangle the Cuban Revolution. In an exclusive interview with CUBA INTERNACION-AL, Hector Rodriguez Llompart, the minister president of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation (CECE), discussed the concepts that govern the development of cooperation, a decisive factor in terms of friendship among nations and effective contribution to peace.

For Cuba's enemies, it is totally inexplicable and, therefore, illogical. For its friends, for those who are familiar with the plans of the Cuban Revolutionary Government, the matter is clearcut and absolutely coherent.

What is involved — and this has often been said — is a small country still carrying on its shoulders the heavy legacy of many decades of underdevelopment, about which the iron pincers of the economic blockade imposed by the foremost capitalist power in the world have remained closed for over 20 years now.

It is the same country that has been expeditiously condemned to political isolation by the regional agencies controlled by the United States; it is the small country that is being fought with large and costly propaganda media and whose ties of friendship with other peoples they are trying to cut off.

And the surprise lies in the fact that, despite everything that has just been explained, Cuba extends its hand in friendship and comradeship to a large number of nations on all the world's continents and has made sincere cooperation a vital principle of its foreign policy, a principle all the men and women who live on this West Indian island share and defend.

The reason why coercive measures to prevent this triumph of cooperation and mutual aid will not suffice lies precisely in the very existence of the revolutionary movement that evolved in Cuba after the hasty flight of dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959.

The popular insurrection that achieved victory that year also forged for Cubans an entirely new conception of what cooperation is and means; this has enabled them to promote valuable initiatives in that direction.

To get a glimpse of the overall picture, we decided to talk to Hector Rodriguez Llompart, the minister president of CECE, the central agency for cooperation efforts in Cuba.

CECE is a young state institution, created in November 1976 by a Council of Ministers law, one which has precedents in the country's institutional organization, the now-defunct National Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation and the Ministry of Industrial Development, the latter for several years dedicated to the drafting of projects and the negotiation and contracting of industrial plants and equipment.

This state committee governs economic cooperation in Cuba and, in accordance with the chief functions assigned to it, it prepares for, directs and controls intergovernmental negotiations in this field and in that of scientific-technical cooperation.

It also carries out trade negotiations with the outside world for the importing and exporting of projects, industrial plants and other objects of cooperation — including some equipment — and, through the enterprises under its administration, signs contracts for the exporting and importing of industrial objectives.

Another one of its important activities is the planning of the foreign technical assistance that Cuba receives and provides. As concerns economic cooperation, it also handles relations with the international agencies, including those of the socialist community, the UN system and those of a regional nature like the Latin American Economic System (SELA), the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE) and others.

CECE governs nine enterprises, four of them importers and exporters of complete plants and other supplies, two devoted to the drafting of projects and other technical—economic studies, one to the importing and exporting of technical assistance and the two remaining ones to administering the services provided foreign technicians in this country.

Abroad — and as part of the organization of the committee — Cuba has some 30 economic offices in as many countries, while nationally there are 14 regional delegations.

Now that we have described CECE, we may go on to our meeting with Rodriguez Llompart, who is also one of the youngest ministers in the Cuban Government. In his central agency office with a beautiful view of Havana Bay as a backdrop, he spoke to us about the general guidelines on which Cuba's economic cooperation with other countries is based:

"Cuban economic cooperation came into being under the sign of internationalism and solidarity, concepts firmly adopted by our revolutionary government and

consistently engaged in by our people. Activities in this field were initiated only a very few months after the revolutionary victory when our economic structure, distorted by American neocolonial and imperialist control, and the grave situation the country was facing required the application of profound political, social and economic changes."

He went on to describe how the United States responded to the first revolutionary measures, beginning with the agrarian reform program, with the elimination of sugar purchases from Cuba in order to economically stifle the country.

"The immediate solidary act of the Soviet Union, which bought our sugar, frustrated this aggressive action. At the start of 1960 cooperation with the USSR was formalized by the signing of a long-term credit agreement and relations with other socialist countries were actively promoted.

"Subsequently these ties were strengthened, cooperation with the industrialized capitalist nations was promoted and cooperation with the underdeveloped countries, up to now characterized by constant expansion and development, was launched."

Rodriguez Llompart spoke of the two basic lines of Cuban economic cooperation and gave a detailed account of several concepts:

"In the domain of aid that Cuba receives, we must lat emphasis on the aid that comes from the socialist camp, and most especially from the USSR, chiefly in the fields of energy, transportation, construction, mining, agriculture, fishing, the sugar industry, health and education. It is also reflected very positively in the investment process undertaken by Cuba, which was aimed at structurally transforming its distorted economy."

With regard to what the people of Cuba offer, Rodriguez Llompart pointed out:

"The assistance Cuba provides in education, health and other fields of economic and social development is very positively assessed by those underdeveloped countries to which it has been and is being directed. We must not forget that in many cases it was first offered under very distressing and difficult circumstances, like natural disasters, the aftermath of liberation wars and imperialist attacks.... As we said, it is governed by the principles of solidarity and internationalism that pervade our activities abroad."

Rodriguez Llompart noted that the list of countries with which Cuba today cooperates is very long and this has made it necessary for us to establish government committees in conjunction with the socialist countries, mixed commissions or similar agencies with the industrialized capitalist nations and cooperative unions with over 30 developing nations.

A brief interruption to take care of an urgent phone call and then he talked about what he considers to be the most conspicuous aspects of the operational organization he heads:

"I believe that economic cooperation has played an important role in dealing with the merciless economic attacks of the United States and its futile effort to strangle the Cuban Revolution. The results produced by these ties with the USSR and other socialist countries are noteworthy because they have afforded the means which, in conjunction with a gigantic effort by our people, have maintained the economic pace and established the bases for future development. The fair treatment accorded Cuba should be noted, treatment that has enabled it to maintain the purchasing power of its sugar by establishing equitable prices for this product so vitally important to our export trade."

The minister then spoke of relations with the industrialized capitalist countries, which are bearing fruit within a framework of mutual respect and profit, an attitude that contrasts with the American blockade.

As for the underdeveloped countries, he explained:

"Materialized by over 15,000 internationalists who are today working abroad — in Latin America, Asia and Africa — providing their services efficiently, painstakingly and with dedication, Cuban cooperation is receiving the gratitude of friendly governments that see in Cuban internationalists the worthy representatives of our revolutionary government."

Our interviewee also referred to the benefits obtained by Cuba through its participation on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA):

"Vast cooperation programs in various disciplines and economic sectors are being carried out within the framework of CEMA. The Specific Programs for Long-Term Cooperation, adopted by the members of CEMA and which comprise the development of fields as important and essential for Cuba as the Accelerated Development Plan for Science and Technology and the geology, nickel, sugar and citrus fruit programs, constitute one very specific example."

At this reporter's request, Rodriguez Llompart gave a brief accounting of the 5-year period 1976-1980 and spoke of current plans:

"During this past 5-year period we received technical assistance, loans in their different forms, complete plants and supplies that involve significant contributions to our development. As for Cuban assistance, worthy of note are the medical and teaching contingents: There are over 2,600 internationalists in the field of health providing service in 26 countries and over 4,000 teachers providing education, from literacy campaigns to the most complicated of university disciplines. In addition, technical-economic studies are being conducted for several countries and projects of major importance are being carried out, with investments being made in objectives fundamental to their economic progress."

Another interesting point Rodriguez Llompart discussed concerned the facilities Cuba provides for the education of students from underdeveloped nations in Cuba, young people who will in the future be much-needed workers and technicians. In connection with this, we should note that over 11,000 students from 10 countries are in intensive training on the Isle of Youth.

In his conversation with this reporter, among the important achievements of this past 5-year period, he mentioned highly significant projects like the manufacture of KTP-1 cane combines, a contribution of great importance to the mechanization of sugar-cane harvesting, and the expansion of the Maximo Gomez Thermoelectric Power Plant as well as that of the Jose Marti Metalworking Enterprise. All of these are the fruit of Soviet aid for Cuban development and bring together the construction, expansion and rebuilding of about 230 projects, among which are a nuclear power plant, a new oil refinery, increasing the production volume of nickel, supplies important to the sugar industry and its mechanical foundations and for geological prospecting.

Rodriguez Llompart also gave us a brief account of what has been happening in the domain of science and technology and, as examples of achievements in our relations with the USSR, he reminded us of the establishment of deep-seated ties between scientific and research institutions in the two countries with their accompanying important contributions in such fields as computer technology, sugar and its by-products and the metal and machine industry. Nor can we forget the great significance of the successfully realized first joint Soviet-Cuban space flight.

With regard to cooperation with other socialist nations, Rodriguez Llompart noted:

"Cooperation with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) has been developed in connection with the Cienfuegos Cement Works, a ball-point pen complex and the furnishing of equipment for agriculture and industry through the signing of over 30 agreements with organizations basically devoted to the farm, electronics and chemical sectors."

The Martires del 26 de Julio Farm Equipment Industrial Complex, a plant for the manufacture of sprinkler components, pumping stations and cold-storage plants, has been built through cooperation with Bulgaria. Moreover, we are working jointly on the development of the water economy, farming and construction.

Thermoelectric units and substations as well as equipment for the sugar industry have come from Czechoslovakia, while with Hungary we have been cooperating in the fields of telecommunications, mechanization of ports, urban bus assembly and other sectors.

Activities relating to the food, machine construction and farm sectors are being discussed with Romania and Yugoslavia, while with Poland the avenues of cooperation have been applied to the furnishing of equipment for the paper industry, the shipyards and the instrument panel and switchboard as well as railroad car factories.

The minister president of CECE talked about another item he considers to be really important:

"I am referring to the certification and training of young Cubans in Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Hungary. There are at present over 12,000 young people being trained in those countries, which will constitute a very positive step in their occupational training."

There was a pause in the conversation for a few minutes to enjoy a good cup of coffee. Immediately after that, after lighting up a Havana cigar, Rodriguez Llompart went on with his explanation:

"On the other hand, we have continued to cooperate with the industrialized capitalist nations — with positive results — and with the international organizations. Among the latter, we should note the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Program (WFP), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the Agricultural Development Fund (ADF), with whom major projects are being carried out in Cuba. In accordance with the guidelines set for the next 5-year period, we will go on strengthening cooperative relations between Cuba and other countries practically applying the principles established by Commander in Chief Fidel Castro."

We think our conversation has served to give the reader an overall picture of the range of cooperation operations Cuba receives and offers, of the distinctive features this activity presents to Cubans and of the importance the revolutionary government assigns to this sector of the economy, which is also a decisive factor for friendship among peoples and a real contribution to peace.

The concepts that govern the development of cooperation for the Cuban people at the same time constitute a very clear explanation of the reasons that have made possible the total failure of plans for isolating Cuba.

11,466 CSO: 3248/634 COUNTRY SECTION EL SALVADOR

OCHOA INCIDENT, U.S. INFLUENCE QUESTIONED

San Salvador EL MUNDO in Spanish 1, 2 Mar 83

[Article by Lola de Hernandez: "We Want An Explanation"]

[1 Mar 83 p 5]

[Text] There is no need for us Salvadorans to be isolated by those who govern us. They should clearly and honestly explain the reasons for their actions and decisions, especially when they are not routine. Firstly, they are beholden to the people for the positions they occupy, and it is the people whom they are trying to ignore, the people who toil to pay their salaries. Secondly, Salvadorans, not foreign countries, should be the first to know what is occurring and what decisions are being made behind the doors of government offices, contrary to what has been happening. And thirdly, to avoid giving credence to rumors which sometimes turn out to be accurate they owe us explanations. For these and other reasons it is necessary that statements and press conferences provide accurate information on what is going on in this country; whatever is being done to resolve a situation should be explained without attempting to conceal, and not as we saw recently when President Magana interjected hearty laughter into his replies to the principal questions reporters asked him. The people are not a plaything; they are not satisfied with the president's usual good sense of humor, nor do they want him to wash his hands like Pilate in such serious situations.

The Sesuntepeque-Uruguay affair was solved in absolute secrecy, the reason given being the state of siege we have had since the military coup but which was not run according to law until now. The minister said such changes were routine within the armed forces, but in the present situation routine decisions are not the rule and the government should act in the best interests of the people, even though General Garcia might admit that "it is human to err," and that the changes were decisions of the high command. The latter, I believe, is composed of four excellent officers but we do not understand how they agreed on such an erroneous course which has put the armed forces in a sad and shameful position in the eyes of the civilian population, destroying our trust and causing us to be bitterly disillusioned. It is known that Colonel Ochoa succeeded in coming out ahead in the conflict existing in the Department of Cabanas. It is natural to conclude that they should not have moved him out but instead should have encouraged him by taking his views

into account before deciding to remove him from his base of operations and putting him behind a desk; his abilities lie in combatting the subversives. This would have avoided all the manoeuvres the armed forces undertook later to right the wrong and clear up the scandal that had such unfortunate results and which gave the guerrillas points. Now, because of the lack of full and clear official information, IT IS SAID that Colonel Ochoa ordered the arrest of Ungo, who, IT WAS RUMORED, was with the foremost rebel of the decade, Colonel Majano, both of whom were granted security and asylum by the gringo embassy. What were these ominous and repudiated personalities planning? If this is not the way it was, let them publish what the colonel did do. General Garcia's remarks that were published in EL DIARIO DE HOY of the 10th of this month charging Ochoa with being corrupted by ambition and power should be clarified. This should also apply to statements made by members of the armed forces, such as the Postmaster and to other high officials who stray. It would be better for the citizens to be informed instead of shielded from crimes that sully the reputation of the institutions involved. premise is that he who commits a crime and he who condones it both deserve the same punishment.

## [2 Mar 83 p 6]

[Text] The present government is the product of a military coup and between coups the only ones who are squeezed are the people. The officials receive their dough every month and the majority have their apartment in "Mayami," taking advantage of the burdensome loans that have helped Salvadoran exiles, like some vulgar thief, to fill their pockets at a time when the nation needs the sacrifices from her children, rather than have them ruin her to become rich and enjoy new-found luxuries, luxuries they have condemned others for, who acquired them through inheritance or sweat.

We do not know what was done in punishment for the many frauds, including purchasing practices that were harmful rather than beneficial to the people's interests, the purchase of Rumanian buses, the alcohol fuel plant, projects costing millions for parks, buildings, and office complexes that are of no urgency now that we are in a time of great austerity. If the people got along without 50 parks in good times, they can just as well continue to breathe polluted air in lean times and without the weight of debt. We want the Accounting Office, the General Treasury, and all those responsible for protecting the interests of Salvadorans to expose the guilty, and let no case be covered by the veil of forgetfulness, as has been the practice up to now. Let those who left the country suddenly be extradited and made to pay for their crimes like any poor soul who is in jail for a trifle, while the new oligarchs strut abroad. We expect this of our president and our armed forces.

As if the people had not had enough already, we have Mr Hinton and the senators and other visitors who make themselves at home, sticking their noses into everything that happens or into problems that concern only Salvadorans.

Where is our dignity and sovereignty if we allow ourselves to be handled like puppets just because of the highly conditional aid that the United States gives us, the greater part of which is not in dollars but will certainly be

paid for in dollars, if I am not mistaken? Why do our officials allow so much interference if what they give us is not free? Although they may grant us loans "with favorable conditions," as Chavez Mena, our foreign minister, said in reference to one line of aid, who, we ask, are the lucky ones, those who ship materials at an assured profit or we foolish ones who must pay in hard cash? It is ridiculous to accept a loan of yellow corn which the peasants will turn around and sell because we all know that Salvadorans do not like it and only use it for hog feed. To make matters worse, it is RUMORED that this corn is contaminated and that the concentrates made from this grain are causing damage on the chicken farms. Is this the progress predicted by Mr Morales Ehrlich, the amateur agronomist, when he assured Salvadorans that they would grow more grains, enough even for export and industrial use, after agrarian reform was implemented? The only thing growing is our debts, and we are up to here in them. It is high time, my dear leaders, to put things, and people, in their place; we have to solve our own problems without asking permission of or consulting with foreigners. We will accept help from those who offer it without trying to manipulate us.

Finally, let us not hand our country over to the communists. The dialogue that they seek to force us into will not be conducted in front of the people, as they have offered to do everything, but behind closed doors. Naturally, the people would not be able to judge or oppose an agreement reached through a dialogue managed by a minority group. We are a sovereign nation with roots that stem from a pure and indomitable race; that is why we are surviving; our people have courageous blood. This nation has not been formed by immigrants, by poverty-stricken city-dwellers who stripped the natives of their lands and killed them mercilessly, and whose descendents now demand respect for human rights and a dialogue with the guerrillas.

The way to defend human rights is by obeying GOD's Ten Commandments, instituted for the benefit of humanity, and not by being like those who appoint themselves human rights defenders—less for love of neighbor than for love of the salary they are earning at neighbor's expense. Let us not let them oppress us any longer; it is not possible that our indomitable red blood is turning into malted milk. We must demand that those who govern over us reject the interference of those who want to manipulate us, and that the people be told the truth.

9015

cso: 3248/616

ORGANIZATIONS EXPRESS CONCERN OVER U.S. POLICY

PA100405 St Georges Domestic Service in English 2300 GMT 9 Apr 83

[Text] The Guyana Council of Churches as well as the Guyana Human Rights Association have expressed great concern over U.S. intervention in the region. The position of the two organizations was outlined in a letter to the United States ambassador in Georgetown, Gerald E. Thomas.

The letter follows what both organizations said are serious threats to the peace of the region created by recent events in Central America and the Caribbean as a result of U.S. intervention.

The letter referred in particular to the invasion of Nicaragua by supporters of the late dictator Anastasio Somoza, the allegation that Grenada constitutes a threat to the United States and the violent death of the president of El Salvador's Human Rights Commission.

The organizations said that they support the view expressed in many quarters that external military assistance to any faction in Central America and the Caribbean postpones and undermines the prospects for peace and democracy.

The letter to the U.S. ambassador said: The concern of both organizations descends from the fact that the level of instability in the region is dangerously high and respect for human rights is sufficiently precarious for additional acts of aggression to escalate into more generalized violence.

The letter said that at an alleged supply of arms to the factions opposing the Sandinist government in Nicaragua, the military government in El Salvador and at an open critic of the Grenadian revolution, the United States must accept that it has an active responsibility for developments in the region.

The groups said that carrying out of NATO military maneuvers in the Caribbean concurrently with the invasion of Nicaragua and the increase of U.S. hostility toward Grenada constitutes an additional reason for the concern over policies towards the region.

Of Grenada the letter said: Quote, if this small country constitutes a threat to the United States, as President Reagan has charged, it is

advisable, for the credibility of the United States administration that some convincing details be made public, unquote.

The letter by the Guyana Human Rights Association and the Guyana Council of Churches ended by expressing alarm at the increasing bellicose attitude that the United States is encouraging within the region.

CSO: 3298/1240

#### LOAN AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH CANADA

FL311445 Bridgetown CANA in English 1447 GMT 31 Mar 83

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, Mar 31, CANA--Guyana will receive a 14 million dollar (Can) loan from Canada to help stimulate manufacturing under an agreement signed here.

"The loan is intended for the purchase by local manufacturers and whole-salers of Canadian intermediate goods, spare parts, agricultural inputs and a limited amount of medical supplies," Canadian High Commissioner Julian Payne said at the signing ceremony.

There is also a memorandum of understanding for a grant of two million dollars (Can).

"This loan and the grant is part of Canada's ongoing development assistance programme with Guyana. It has a number of features which are new and which we have not used before," Mr Payne said.

"This is a short term economic assistance loan, expected to be disbursed over the next two years and is primarily intended to assist the manufacturing sector," he said.

The high commissioner said the loan has been signed in anticipation of the government of Guyana reaching agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new aid package.

"One of the objectives of the loan is to support that signing of the agreement with the  ${\rm IMF}$ ," he said.

"The second aspect...is that it is conditional on the government implementing its economic action programme agreed on last year with the World Bank," Mr Payne said.

Guyana's vice president for economic planning and finance Desmond Hoyte said Canada was one of the most consistent supporters of this country in terms of economic assistance.

A spokesman for the high commission said a special steering committee, comprising representatives from Guyanese agencies and ministries and the Canadian diplomatic mission will recommend commodities which can be purchased with the loan funds from an agreed indicative list.

He said the list will be approved by the Guyana Government and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

The spokesman also said the goods and materials to be procured from Canada under the loan will be paid for by Guyanese importers in Guyana dollars.

CSO: 3298/1240

### CATHOLIC PAPER ON GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION

FL111555 Bridgetown CANA in English 1552 GMT 10 Apr 83

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, April 10, CANA--The Catholic standard newspaper has described Guyana as being rife with corruption and claims government officials try to supplement low earnings with kickbacks.

In an editorial, the weekly Catholic Church publication said: "As our country sinks more deeply into an economic and social morass, we are exhorted by those in power to strive for survival."

Businessmen need no encouragement to survive, the paper remarked, adding: "Their one preoccupation is to get licences and foreign exchange or buy on the parallel market in order to keep their doors open."

"For the hucksters," the paper said, "it is a matter of using every means to beat the regulations so that they can make a living for themselves.

"Corruption is rife, as officials seek to supplement their meagre wages with kickbacks so that they too can live."

The Catholic standard said that "individuals keep silent in the face of injustices, accept wage freezes and victimisations, march, turn out for voluntary labour and send their children to mass games and to line the streets, lest they endanger the little they have."

It said with all the efforts to survive, conditions for Guyanese still got worse and that the will to survive was obviously not enough.

cso: 3298/1240

#### LETTER ON BORDER DISPUTE STUDIED BY VENEZUELA

FL111410 Bridgetown CANA in English 2231 GMT 10 Apr 83

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, April 10, CANA--Venezuela is studying Guyana's recent letter indicating this country's decision to refer their territorial dispute to secretary general of the United Nations (UN) Perez de Cuellar for possible settlement, Venezuelan ambassador to Georgetown Sadio Garavini said.

Venezuela has century-old claim to five-eights of Guyana.

"The letter is being studied," the Venezuelan ambassador said.

Asked about the time factor involved in reaching a settlement, Garavini said: "The Geneva agreement provides a complex framework for the solution of the controversy and does not provide a simple and quick process."

Guyana's Foreign Minister Rashleigh Jackson said Guyana's decision to refer the matter to the UN secretary general was another demonstration of the country's commitment to a peaceful solution of the controversy within the framework of the Geneva agreement.

CSO: 3298/1240

#### TIMBER SALE CONTRACT SIGNED WITH PRC

FL111622 Bridgetown CANA in English 1643 GMT 10 Apr 83

[Text] Georgetown, Guyana, April 10, CANA--The People's Republic of China is buying just over[?two] million dollars (1 Guy dollar; 33 cents U.S.) worth of timber from Guyana, THE CHRONICLE newspaper has reported.

The contract for supplying the timber [word indistinct] Guyana woods was signed just over a week ago, the government-owned paper said.

THE CHRONICLE said the new contract is the second one between Guyana and China.

In 1979, Guyana landed a big supply order and the emphasis then was also on lesser known species of wood, the paper said.

The species required for the new contract are: locust, hububalli, determa, tatabu-aromata, manni, manniballi, greenheart, purpleheart, suya, kurokai, korokororo, wamara, brown and kereti silverballi, dukalli and simparupa.

THE CHRONICLE said the agreement was negotiated by a team from the Guyana Forestry Commission headed by Deputy Chairman John Douglas and a two-member Chinese team led by Zhao Zhimging of the China National Native Produce and Animal By-Products Import and Export Corporation.

The paper said the two shipments will be made by year-end and supplies were expected to come from the major timber-producing areas of the country.

The other member of the Chinese team was Mr Zhang Bad Yu. They have left the country.

CSO: 3298/1240

#### BRIEFS

NEW FRENCH ENVOY--Georgetown, Guyana, 25 Mar, CANA--The new nonresident French ambassador to Guyana Francoise Claude-Lafontaine is due in Georgetown within a week to present her credentials to Vice President Steve Naraine, it has been officially announced here. Madame Francoise Claude-Lafontaine will replace Marquis Rene de Choiseul Praslin as ambassador to Guyana, a government release said here. The French ambassador to Guyana is based in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. [Text] [FL252000 Bridgetown CANA in English 1836 GMT 25 Mar 83 FL]

RICE SALE TO TRINIDAD--Georgetown, Guyana, 30 Mar, CANA--Trinidad and Tobago has agreed to purchase 30,000 tonnes of bulk rice from Guyana, and half of it has already been shipped, it has been officially announced here. General manager of the state-run Guyana rice board Leon Dundas said Trinidad had also purchased 400 tonnes of packaged rice, but order was small compared with the 3,000 tons of a former agreement. "Competition especially from producers outside the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) region has caused this country's share in the Trinidad market to drop steeply, but efforts are being made to recover the loss," he said. [Excerpt] [FL301440 Bridgetown CANA in English 1425 GMT 30 Mar 83 FL]

SCHOLARSHIPS OFFERED--Georgetown, Guyana, 7 Apr, CANA--Guyanese have been offered scholarship awards for undergraduate studies in East Germany, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Iraq and Romania, it has been officially announced here. The Guyana Public Service Ministry said the fields of study are medicine, dentistry, mechanical engineering, civil engineering, transport engineering, international economic relations, agronomy and fisheries. The offers were published in the government-owned CHRONICLE newspaper. Applicants must be between the ages of 18 and 25 and must possess General Certificate of English (GCE) passes in at least two subjects at advanced level, with good grades. [Text] [FLO72040 Bridgetown CANA in English 2006 GMT 7 Apr 83]

DEFENSE AGAINST VENEZUELA FUNDS--Georgetown, Guyana, 11 Apr, CANA--Guyana has raised more than 10 million dollars (one Guy dollar; 33 cents U.S.) in an effort to strengthen its defence capacity to deal with what the government sees as an invasion threat from neighbouring Venezuela with which it has a century-old border dispute, a government spokesman said. The government started selling defence premium bonds a year ago to raise funds, and the

spokesman said that last month 250,000 dollars (U.S.) worth of bonds had been sold. President Forbes Burnham has repeatedly said that Venezuela may try to settle by force their border dispute. This former British colony's Spanish-speaking neighbour is claiming five-eights of Guyana's territory, including the mineral-rich Essequibo region. [Text] [FL111905 Bridgetown CANA in English 1740 GMT 11 Apr 83]

cso: 3298/1240

COUNTRY SECTION MEXICO

#### UPCOMING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS POSE PROBLEMS FOR PRI

### PRI Fortification Campaign

Tuxtla Guiterrez LA VOZ DEL SURESTE in Spanish 18 Feb 83 p 7

[Text] Oaxaca, Oax.--The state executive committee of the Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI], headed by Oswaldo Garcia Griollo and Ericel Gomez Nucamendi, have named the first 15 district delegates to begin the task of strengthening the party, a task started recently by the governor himself, Pedro Vasquez Colmenares.

This program has as its objective a campaign of persuasion among all the district, municipal, and sectional committees of the organization, according to the call for fortification issued by the governor.

Therefore, the state executive committee of the PRI appointed Ruben Vasconcelos-Beltran as delegate for Juchitan; Sergio Lovo Ortega for Tehuantepec; for Pochutla, Hector Anuar Mafud Mafud; Alfredo Benitez Toledo deputy for Tlacolula, and so forth.

PRI leader Garcia Criollo exhorted all of them to work as hard as they can on the task given to them by the party, in order to unify all social sectors behind the PRI, so that the party will win the municipal elections at the end of this year.

Oaxaca Among Weak Points

Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 22 Feb 83 pp 4-A, 22-A

[From "Political Fronts" Column by Guillermo Canton Zetina]

[Text] Alert to PRI in 21 Municipalities

The Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI] may face grave problems, and even in some cases lose, in 21 municipalities throughout the country holding elections this year. As the officers on the national executive committee themselves admit, the Institutional Revolutionary Party must be very careful in its selection of candidates, since, as it is already well-known, the dissasifaction of PRI members themselves causes more problems for the party than its traditional opponents.

One member of the national executive committee of the PRI admitted that in order to achieve its goal of democratic, participative, municipal assemblies to choose

suitable candidates and banish the danger of defeat, it must avoid the pitfall of certain governors who consider their municipalities as "private property, as if the voters had deeded them the state for 6 years."

So we see that there are going to be problems in Nuevo Laredo, where the present mayor is disputed by the citizens. And if that were not enough, the leader of the local Confederation of Mexican Workers [CTM], Pedro Perez Ibarra, who has the responsibility of urging PRI candidates, has a very poor public image, primarily because of a campaign against him in the Laredo newspaper EL MANANA. Perez Ibarra has gone so far as to found his own newspaper to defend himself. Matamoros has a mayor from the late Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution [PARM], Jorge Cardenas Gonalez, who is in a similar situation to that in Nuevo Laredo, and has a fierce dispute with Agapito Gonzalez, the CTM leader.

The PRI leaders note that during the last election in Matamoros, voting went against the CTM leader rather than against the PRI, and that the same thing may happen in the next elections.

In the state of Chihuahua, they are, first and foremost, concerned about the capital city of Chihuahua, where the National Action Party [PAN] is strong and the nomination may go to Luis H. Alvarez, a presidential candidate in 1958, or perhaps to the former state leader of the blue and white party, Guillermo Prieto.

Ciudad Juarez is also endangered. It is the largest and most populous municipality in the state, and here the PAN is a serious threat, with Jose Posada Pompa, a prestigious PAN member, seen as a challenge to any PRI candidate. In Ciudad Camargo, imports and the dishonesty of CTM mayor Primitivo Campos may finish off the PRI with a devastating knock-out. In Delicias there is a PARM mayor and the area is fertile ground for the opposition.

In Baja California, the nominee for the gubernatorial candidate must be suitable, since if the Tricolor does not make a good choice, that is, listening to the demands of the people of Baja California, it will have serious trouble with the PAN in the governor's race, not to mention the towns of Tijuana and Mexicali.

In Puebla the PRI admits that "if a good candidate is not chosen, we may lose the capital. The blue and white is also a threat in Tehuacan. In Texiutlan there is a Popular Socialist Party [PPS] mayor and the PRI feels certain it can take the municipality back.

In Durango, the tricolor will have a hard time in the lakes region, since the PAN is strong in Lerdo and Gomez Palacio. In the capital it must be noted that during the last federal elections the PAN vote increased markedly, in a city in which votes for the blue and white have never been numerous.

In Sinaloa, the PRI faces trouble in Culiacan and Los Mochis. In the latter town, past elections caused the majority of citizens to believe that the PRI was really the loser, although it was remarked that "the problems have been overcome." The former view was attributed to the fact that "the mayor has done a good job", but mostly to the fact that the most prominent PAN members in Los Mochis are brothers of the state secretary general of government.

Regarding the port of Mazatlan, aside from the rumor circulating that business leader Emilio Goichoechea is considering running for the PAN, which has not been confirmed, there have been no other storm warnings.

In the state of Oaxaca, Juchitan is in the foreground in the hands of the PSUM [Unified Socialist Party of Mexico], through the Independent Student Worker-Peasant Coalition [COCEI] and it does not seem that the PRI has any choice. But the main problem stems from how poor the tricolor candidates are compared to those of the PSUM.

In Huajuapan de Leon, the PAN is strong; in Tuxtepec the strongman rule of Victor Bravo Ahuja has gotten the PRI into difficulties, and other towns with a complicated pol tical situation—for the PRI—include Pinotepa Nacional and Loma Bonita. With regared to the extraordinary elections in Chiapas, the PRI feels certain in at least four of the five municipalities. In Huixtla and Motozintla, the tricolor party feels secure with "peaceful campaigns" because they nominated candidates "that people wanted" and now "the opposition is rejected."

# PRI Practices Criticized

Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 27 Feb 83 pp 4-A, 22-A

[From "Political Fronts" column by Humberto Aranda]

[Text] In Oaxaca, the First Problems

In Oaxaca, where the Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI] has Florencio Salazar Martinez as its delegate, the first problems caused by the nomination of candidates for mayor and local deputies occurred Friday night.

The events took place in Pochutla, and blame was placed on the PRI delegate, who was accused of favoring the interests of the strongmen and landholders in the region. Peasant leader Alejandro Cardenas Peralta, who was forced to resign as municipal president of Pochutla in January 1981 after the state police and the army supported the takeover of the municipal presidency at the instigation of the businessmen, last Friday also resigned from his post as assistant secretary for organization of the state executive committee of the PRI.

He said that he was protesting delegate Salazar Martinez' attempt from the beginning to make him stand aside and leave the way open to the regional oligarchy.

Cardenas Peralta's stand was supported in the nominating assembly headed by Salazar Martinez by 500 angry peasants who practically ran off the delegate and other PRI envoys.

Once Cardenas Peralta snatched the microphone from the PRI delegate and reminded him that it was a nominating assembly and was not intended to "impose a decision sent down from the center."

Correspondent Rafael Emilio Bermudez reported that Cardenas Peralta publicly stressed that the PRI, with its policy of favoring those who exploit and subdue the peasants, is forcing them to turn to the Workers, Peasants', and Students' Coalition of the Isthmus [COCEI].

In truth, Cardenas is the president of the Vigilance Committee of the Pochutla Commissariat of Communal Properties, and as such he has faced those who monopolize land on the coast at Puerto Angel.

He has mainly denounced Julio Jalil and Antonio Mendiola, who have fenced off 500 hectares of the coastline. It is said that Jalil is the one who sold former president Lopez Portillo the Angel del Mar hotel, where the former president spent last Christmas holidays.

8587

CSO: 3248/621

COUNTRY SECTION ST KITTS

ASSEMBLY APPROVES GOVERNMENT'S 1983-84 BUDGET

FL231415 Bridgetown CANA in English 1353 GMT 23 Mar 83

[Text] Basseterre, St Kitts, March 23, CANA--The St Kitts-Nevis House of Assembly last night approved the government's 194 million dollar (one EC dollar; 37 cents U.S.) 1983-84 budget, which opposition leader Lee Moore described as "a formula for depression."

The ex-premier, who spoke for three hours in the house yesterday, said that the budget was setting the stage for a depression similar to that of 1929 in the United States because wages were being lowered and prices were being heightened.

The 1983 draft estimates show that the government collected about 51.5 million dollars in 1982. The government's recurrent revenue for 1983-84 is estimated at 62.5 million dollars—an 11 million dollar increase.

Minister of Finance Simeon Daniel delivered the budget address last Monday, saying the government proposed to raise the 11 million dollars by increases in import duties, property tax, electricity rates, philatelic bureau profits and currency profits.

Mr Daniel said that he had predicted a 7 million dollar deficit on recurrent account, but preliminary figures produced by the treasury put the deficit at 12.6 million.

CSO: 3298/1242

COUNTRY SECTION ST KITTS

#### FINANCE MINISTER PRESENTS EC \$194 MILLION BUDGET

FL220025 Bridgetown CANA in English 2356 GMT 21 Mar 83

[Text] Basseterre, St Kitts, March 21, CANA--St Kitts-Nevis Finance Minister Simeon Daniel today presented a 194 million dollar (one EC dollar; 37 cents U.S.) budget for 1983 which he said government expected to have balanced.

In what is expected to be the last budget prior to gaining independence from Britain in September, Mr Daniel also announced a wide range of tax increases relating to restaurant licence fees, police certificates, work permits, registration fees for drivers licences and the duty on alcoholic liquor.

The minister also said government intended to amend legislation and drastically increase fines to be imposed for having illicit rum, smuggling and possession of illegal drugs.

"The purpose of this budget is not to place hardships on our citizens," Mr Daniel said. "We should strive for our economic independence, even as we attain political independence."

Mr Daniel did not elaborate on how the loans and grants would be raised to finance the budget. Last year government had anticipated a seven million dollar deficit but the revised total was 12 million dollars.

Mr Daniel announced that one million dollars would be allocated for independence celebrations. He said this figure was only an estimate and government did not know what the actual costs would be.

The finance minister stated that the capital budget was 131 million dollars.

Mr Daniel said: "The total recurrent expenditure for 1983 is estimated at 62,152,561 dollars (EC) and the recurrent revenue for 1983 is estimated at 62,516,044 dollars."

"Even though we have had to include some heavy items of expenditure relating to this, our independence year, our recurrent expenditure for 1983 has only exceeded 1982 by 1.6 million dollars, a modest increase of 2.7 percent," he said.

The minister said that new arrangements were being made in the estimate heads for 1983, on which certain expenditures were transferred to the Ministry of Nevis Affairs.

However, the premier's ministry comprising administration, establishments, service commissions, radio and television, government printery, registrar's offices, magistrates and planning unit, show a total expenditure of 4.1 million dollars—an increase of 1.1 million dollars.

He said the main item in this increase was the one million dollars provided for independence celebrations.

"We are a poor country...independence is the most important milestone in our history and therefore although resources are scarce, we must exert every effort to make the occasion a memorable one."

"The one million dollar figure for independence was only an estimate," Mr Daniel said, "and we do not know what the actual cost will be. However, we expect private citizens, firms and organisations to participate in practical ways to make our independence celebration a memorable occasion."

"Even though resources are scarce we must continue our programme of capital development. We shall soon be an independent nation and this will make it even more necessary to improve the infrastructure of the state."

He said government expected to contribute about 2.3 million dollars from local revenue to the capital budget.

He also said that one million dollars has been put into the estimates for the replacing of the Supreme Court building which was destroyed by fire in September 1982.

But he added that the cost is likely to be much more.

Two million dollars have also been set down for the construction of a new public library in Basseterre to replace the one destroyed in last year's court house fire.

Meanwhile, several increases in taxes have been proposed.

The registration fee for vehicles goes up from two dollars and 50 cents, to 10 dollars and lost drivers licences, previously free, will now cost five dollars.

The cost of police certificates will be increased from 50 cents to two dollars, work permits, once 500 dollars, will cost 750 dollars.

Restaurant licence fees, now 50 dollars a quarter, are to go up 75 dollars for the same period and wholesale liquor licences from 150 dollars to 250 dollars per quarter. There will also be a 25 percent increase on the duty for alcoholic liquor.

Opposition member E. St John Payne, the first speaker to reply to the budget speech, described it as "ineffective and unfair."

He said that "it seeks to take substantial increases from the taxpayer and the community in general when in reality it is known that the people are unable to pay."

He drew reference to property tax, which is being presently increased in some cases from 30 dollars to 300 dollars.

Electricity rates, he pointed out, have gone up by at least 150 percent.

"In light of all these exorbitant increases which will multiply in the economy," Mr Payne said, "the government's policy as seen in the sugar industry is that they can find no money to pay for increased wages to offset the substantial increases in the cost of living."

He argued that sugar workers were the poorest of the poor community here and were being asked to pay these increases in taxes and the cost of living and at the same time were being asked to freeze their wages or to take less.

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